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Abstract
In this paper, we design the first computationally efficient codes for simultaneously reliable and covert communication
over Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs). Our setting is as follows — a transmitter Alice wishes to potentially reliably
transmit a message to a receiver Bob, while ensuring that the transmission taking place is covert with respect to an
eavesdropper Willie (who hears Alice’s transmission over a noisier BSC). Prior works show that Alice can reliably and
covertly transmit O(√n) bits over n channel uses without any shared secret between Alice and Bob. One drawback of
prior works is that the computational complexity of the codes designed scales as 2Θ(
√
n). In this work we provide the
first computationally tractable codes with provable guarantees on both reliability and covertness, while simultaneously
achieving the best known throughput for the problem.
I. Introduction
Alice may or may not wish to communicate with a receiver Bob over a Binary Symmetric Channel with crossover probability
p, denoted by BSC(p). However, an adversary Willie is able to eavesdrop on their communication over a “noisier” Binary
Symmetric Channel – BSC(q) (here q is strictly larger than1 p), and only cares about whether Alice is transmitting or not.
Therefore, Alice would like to use a novel communication scheme to prevent her transmission status from being detected by
Willie (covert with respect to Willie) and also ensure that her messages are received by Bob correctly.2
We first give an overview of several problems related to our setup. Shannon first defined the concept of information-theoretic
security [3], which requires the key rate to be as large as the message rate to achieve perfect secrecy. Kerckhoff’s principle [4],
however, states that a system should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. Wyner
demonstrated that shared secrets can be replaced with asymmetry in channel noise [5], [6] (as in this work). The reader is
referred to [7], [8] for recent surveys on physical-layer security. The classical steganography problem, which considers how
to hide a undetectable message in plain sight, has been well-studied — see, for instance, [9] for a survey. Cachin [10] first
focused on the problem of information-theoretic steganography, and Maurer [11] drew connections between the problem of
steganography and that of hypothesis testing. In [12], Wang and Moulin gave an information-theoretic characterization of the
capacity of the perfectly secure steganography problem (with unbounded-sized shared secrets between Alice and Bob).
We now turn to reliable and covert communication, which is the main focus of this work. Even though, the early literature
on this topic used a plethora of terms such as “covertness”, “deniability” and “low probability of detection (LPD)” to define
essentially the same security requirement, of late, the term “covertness” has gained acceptance as the preferred nomenclature.
Bash et al. gave the first results on information-theoretically guaranteed covert communication over noisy AWGN channels [13]–
[16]. Noting that the result of Bash et al. relied critically on the presence of large shared secrets between Alice and Bob3. Che
et al. designed reliable and covert (and information-theoretically secure) communication schemes over BSCs without using
any shared secrets, relying only on the asymmetry of level of channel noise on the two channels [17]–[20]. The work of [21]
studied covert communication from a channel resolvability approach, while Wang et al. [22] and Bloch [2] first derived tight
capacity characterizations for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). We discuss the intuition behind these schemes in greater
detail in Section II below.
While the plethora of codes and bounds in the recent literature paint a clear picture of the limits of reliable communication
possible between the transmitter Alice and the receiver Bob while remaining covert (or deniable/stealthy/LPD) with respect
to the eavesdropper Willie, prior to this work there were still no computationally efficient communication schemes with
information-theoretic proofs of covertness. Though a variety of computationally-efficient schemes [23]–[28] give good heuristics
for such communication, they typically lack proofs that the proposed schemes do indeed provide information-theoretic covertness
of such detectors that may be employed by the eavesdropper, regardless of the computational complexity.
In this paper, we present the first coding scheme which has provable throughput and covertness guarantees while ensuring
that the computational complexity for both encoding and decoding is at most polynomial in the number of transmitted message
bits. Throughout this paper we use asymptotic notation [29, Ch. 3.1] to describe the limiting behaviour of functions. The
The work of Qiaosheng Zhang, Mayank Bakshi and Sidharth Jaggi described in this paper was partially supported by a grant from University Grants
Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. AoE/E-02/08).
A preliminary version of this work [1] was presented at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Barcelona, Spain.
1Note that without this asymmetry, whenever Bob can decode reliably, so can Willie.
2For ease of exposition, in this work we focus on scenarios in which all channels are BSCs. However, following the lead of [2], it is likely that these results
can be directly generalized to other DMCs.
3In fact, the size of the keys required by their scheme is larger than the throughput from Alice to Bob.
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2rest of this paper is organized as follows. We formally describe our model in Section III. In Section IV, we give the main
result of this paper, and provide a performance characterization of a specific class of computationally-efficient reliable and
covert communication schemes. Section V describes the corresponding codes in greater detail. We introduce the mathematical
preliminaries and probability distributions of interest in Sections VI. Sections VII and VIII provide the proofs of covertness and
reliability respectively of our codes. Section IX concludes this work and proposes several future directions that are worthy
exploring.
II. Intuition
We begin by first giving an intuitive description of our work and place it in the context of prior works.
A. Challenges
The intuition behind the covert schemes first presented in [13] and elaborated on in other works such as [2], [14], [16]–[20],
[22], [30] is that most reasonable noise processes have, with non-zero probability, “some deviation” in the “noise intensity”.
For instance, a length-n Bernoulli(q) sequence (corresponding to the additive noise sequence in a BSC(q) – a Binary Symmetric
Channel with crossover probability q – the channel from the transmitter Alice to the eavesdropper Willie) has expected value
nq, but has standard deviation
√
nq(1 − q). Hence, if Alice uses a carefully designed codebook containing codewords with low
Hamming weight (about O(√n)) then the expected “power density” at the eavesdropper (about nq +O(√n)) may reasonably be
attributed by Willie to natural variations in the noise-level he observes. Further, it is also known [17] that to ensure covertness
in communication, one must use codes with very low average Hamming weight (i.e., with weights no larger than4 O(√n)).
This restriction on codeword weights, along with the requirement that Bob be able to reliably decode, implies that the optimal
reliable throughput from Alice to Bob that is simultaneously covert with respect to Willie scales only as a factor of
√
n, rather
than linearly in the number of channel uses (as is the common paradigm in Shannon theory). Hence the capacity of such
covert communication schemes converges to zero! The interesting “first-order” question, therefore, is how many bits can be
communicated reliably (to Bob) and covertly (with respect to Willie) as a function of the square-root of the number of channel
uses.
However, just choosing a codebook with low average Hamming weight does not suffice to guarantee covertness. For instance,
suppose Alice chooses a codebook containing length-n binary vectors such that about half of the first
√
n locations are non-zero,
but all the succeeding n − √n bits in each codeword are zero. While such a codebook would satisfy the low average Hamming
weight requirement, it is nonetheless still easy for Willie to detect whether or not Alice is transmitting in such a scenario. If
Alice is silent, he would expect to see about q
√
n non-zero values in the first
√
n locations of his observation (with a standard
deviation of about O(n1/4)), whereas if Alice were transmitting a non-zero codeword, he would expect to see about √n/2
non-zero values in the same locations (again with a standard deviation of about O(n1/4)). By relatively standard analysis from
the hypothesis-testing literature [31], it can be shown his estimate of Alice’s transmission status would be correct with high
probability (over the noise in the channel to him). Hence one needs “good spreading” of the bits in the codewords as well –
not all codewords can have their support concentrated in the same small set of locations.5
While the above serves as good intuition for constructing covert communication schemes, providing mathematical guarantees
for a given code can be extremely challenging – one has to prove that two different probability distributions supported on an
exponentially large set are “very close”. Specifically, one distribution, denoted by P0, corresponds to the scenario when Alice is
silent, and corresponds to a Binomial(n, q) distribution. The other, denoted by P1, corresponds to the scenario when Alice is
transmitting using some code C. Both these distributions are supported on the set (of exponential size in the block-length n)
of possible observations seen by the eavesdropper Willie. Since the structure of P1 depends intimately on the structure of C,
characterizing the difference between P0 and P1 for any specific code, or specific ensembles of codes, can be quite complicated.
A second challenge is due to the fact that most computationally efficient code designs in the literature (see, for example, [32],
[33]) naturally lead to codes such that the average Hamming weight of codewords in the code is tightly concentrated around
half the block-length, n/2. As noted above, simply designing codes of block-length about O(√n) and embedding the codewords
into a pre-specified and publicly known set of about O(√n) locations in length-n vectors padded with 0s also does not work.
To the best of our knowledge, prior to this work there were no binary constant composition codes [34] with such low Hamming
weight, with good spreading properties, that enable communication at rates close to the optimal rates characterized in [2], [17],
[22], and that are simultaneously computationally-efficient to encode and decode.
B. Our approach
Our approach is to use concatenated-style codes, that are inspired by Forney’s classical work [35] that gave the first
computationally-efficient codes for arbitrary channels that also approached capacity. Forney noticed that since the computational
4The results of [19] indicate an interesting phenomenon when there is uncertainty about the level of noise of the channel, and the coherence time is “long” –
then, in fact, the throughput can be shown to scale linearly with the number of channel uses, rather than as
√
n.
5Indeed, this is the intuition in some recent heuristic approaches [23]–[28] to designing covert communication schemes – codes designed via “spread
spectrum” techniques are analyzed. However, an information-theoretically rigorous proof of the covertness of such schemes is lacking.
3cost of Shannon’s random codes is exponential in the blocklength n, dividing the message into Θ(log n)-sized chunks and
applying Shannon’s codes on each chunk would ensure that the overall complexity is only polynomial in the total blocklength,
while still operating at rates close to the channel capacity. However, naïvely applying this “divide-and-conquer” idea would
lead to an overall high decoding error probability owing to the small blocklength (and hence, relatively large decoding error
probability) for each chunk and the large number of chunks. In order to overcome this, Forney’s solution was to combine the
“inner code” provided by Shannon with an “outer code”. The purpose of the outer code – typically a Reed-Solomon (RS) code –
is to computationally efficiently correct any chunks that are in error by paying a negligible rate penalty.
We follow Forney’s lead, but adapt our construction to the constraints imposed by covertness. Foremost, while Forney’s
construction operates with Θ(n) message bits, in our setting, at most O(√n) bits of reliable transmission are possible. Thus, to
ensure that each chunk contains Θ(log n) message bits, the blocklength for each chunk is Θ(
√
n log n). First, we encode using
an RS outer code to create “coded-chunks” from the message chunks. Next, we encode each chunk by using an independently
drawn ensemble of low-weight random codes [17] that has the property that the expected codeword weight for each chunk is
Θ(log n).
With the above concatenated construction, the reliability analysis proceeds along familiar lines (with some parameter tweaks).
Proving covertness, perhaps not surprisingly, turns out to be much more challenging. The first complication is imposed by the
outer code – the ensemble of codes that our construction generates has linear dependencies between the chunks. This breaks
the analysis from [17] that critically relies on each bit of the codewords being generated independently. It is conceivable that
since the code is known to Willie, he may test for these dependencies and be able to come up with clever estimators of the
transmission status. To overcome this problem, we use a systematic Reed-Solomon code. This decomposition of the chunks
into systematic chunks and parity chunks is helpful in two ways. Firstly, this ensures that, at the very least, the systematic
chunks are independently generated (since these correspond to independent message bits). Secondly, this also lets us show that,
from Willie’s perspective the conditional distribution of transmissions in the parity chunks (of the Reed-Solomon outer code) is
essentially statistically independent of Willie’s observations of transmissions in the systematic chunks, thus preventing him
from gaining any advantage in estimating Alice’s transmission status by using the dependencies.
A second, and more technical, challenge is to prove that with high probability, the code for each chunk is covert. In prior
works such as [17], this is proved by first showing that under the ensemble-averaged distribution, the codebook is covert and
then using a concentration argument over to show that with high probability over the codebook generation, the distribution
imposed by the actual codebook is close to the ensemble average. Our concatenated code, however, only contains a polynomially
small number of codewords in each chunk, since the chunk length scales as Θ(
√
n log n). Especially when p approaches6 q, we
need to provide a more sensitive analysis to ensure polynomially many plausible codewords for Willie in each chunk, but with
high probability (w.h.p.) only one for Bob. Finally, we need to carefully combine proofs of covertness in each chunk to get
covertness for the overall code.
By following this intuition, our work proves that one can communicate reliably and covertly with the best known throughput [17],
while requiring a computational complexity that is at most polynomial in the blocklength n.
III. Model
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, we use the following conventions. We take all logarithms to be binary and
use exp(a) to represent ea for a ∈ R. Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, while their realizations are denoted by
lowercase letters. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters. Vectors are denoted by underlined boldface letters. The length of
each vector will be clear from the context.
Channel model: The channel between the transmitter Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob is a BSC(p), and the channel
between Alice and the malicious eavesdropper Willie is a BSC(q), where q > p (note that without this asymmetry, whenever
Bob can decode reliably, so can Willie). Alice’s transmission status is denoted by T ∈ {0, 1} and the message is denoted by
M ∈ {0} ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,N}. When Alice communicates with Bob, her transmission status T = 1 and the transmitted message M is
chosen uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . ,N}. When Alice does not communicate with Bob, her transmission status T = 0
and the default message M = 0 is transmitted. All three parties know the channel parameters p and q, but only Alice knows the
transmission status T and the message M a priori. Figure 1 illustrates the system diagram of the communication model.
Encoder: Alice’s encoder is defined through the encoding function Ψ(·) : {0} ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,N} → {0, 1}n , that is applied on the
message M to obtain the length-n binary codeword X = Ψ(M). In particular, the innocent message M = 0 will always be
encoded to the length-n zero vector, i.e., X = 0. We define the rate of the code as R = (logN)/n, and the relative throughput
as r = (logN)/
√
n. It is preferable to use the relative throughput r because when n goes to infinity, the relative throughput r
scales as a constant while the rate R goes to zero.
Decoder: Bob receives the length-n binary vector Y = X⊕Ny, where Ny is the noise vector induced by the BSC(p), and applies a
decoder map Γ(·) : {0, 1}n → {0}∪{1, 2, . . . ,N} to reconstruct the message Mˆ from his observation Y. The goal is to guarantee the
communication is reliable, i.e., the average probability of error satisfies limn→∞ Perr = 0, where Perr , maxi∈{0,1} P(Mˆ , M|T = i)
Estimator: Willie aims to estimate T from his observation Z = X ⊕ Nz, where Nz is the noise vector induced by the BSC(q),
6As p approaches q, the chunk length grows accordingly.
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Fig. 1: Reliable-Deniable Communication system diagram: Alice has a message M that can take N values {1, . . . ,N}, and the transmission status T ∈ {0, 1}. If Alice’s transmission
status T = 0, she is required to “stay silent” – transmit the all zero codeword 0 – this corresponds to the 0 message. On the other hand, if her transmission status T = 1, she uses
her encoder Ψ to encode her message M into a codeword X. This X is broadcast to the legitimate receiver Bob, and the eavesdropper Willie, over a pair of independent Binary
Symmetric Channels with respective crossover probabilities p and q (respectively denoted by BSC(p) and BSC(q)), which add Bernoulli noise vectors Ny and Nz respectively to
X, resulting in the transmissions Y and Z observed respectively by Bob and Willie. Bob uses a decoder Γ to estimate Alice’s transmitted message M as Mˆ, and wishes to ensure
reliability, i.e. the probability (over channel noise Ny) that Mˆ , M is “small”. As a by-product of his decoder, he should therefore also detect Alice’s transmission status. Willie,
on the other hand, only wishes to decode Alice’s transmission status T . A code that is (1 − d)-covert ensures that, regardless of Willie’s estimator, the probability (over Alice’s
message M and channel noise Ny) that P(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) + P(Tˆ = 0|T = 1) ≥ 1 − d .
by using an estimator Φ(·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that outputs the estimate Tˆ = Φ(Z) of the transmission status. We use a hypothesis-
testing metric to measure the covertness of the communication. Let α(Φ) = PNz (Tˆ = 1|T = 0) be the probability of false alarm,
and β(Φ) = PM,Nz(Tˆ = 0|T = 1) be the probability of missed detection. The communication is deemed to be (1 − d)-covert if
there does not exist an estimator Φ such that α(Φ) + β(Φ) < 1 − d. Let P0 be the innocent distribution of Z when Alice’s
transmission status T = 0 and P1 be the active distribution of Z when Alice’s transmission status T = 1. By standard statistical
arguments [36, Theorem 13.1.1], an optimal hypothesis test Φ∗ satisfies
α(Φ∗) + β(Φ∗) = 1 − V(P0, P1), (1)
where V(P0, P1) = 12
∑
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣P0(z) − P1(z)∣∣∣ denotes the variational distance7 between P0 and P1. Therefore, to guarantee the
communication is (1 − d)-covert, it suffices to show that V(P0, P1) ≤ d.
IV. Main Result
Before stating the main theorem (Theorem 1), we need to define a variety of auxiliary functions and variables that will be
useful in understanding the throughput/reliability/covertness/complexity tradeoffs in the statement of Theorem 1. We first define
f (x) = log e − (1 + x) log (e/(1 + x)). (2)
Given any 0 < p < q < 1/2 and sufficiently small d > 0, we define a code weight design parameter
k2(q, d) = 2d
√
q(1 − q)/(1 − 2q), (3)
and a throughput parameter
ru(p, q, d) = 2d
√
q(1 − q)1 − 2p
1 − 2q log
(
1 − p
p
)
. (4)
The value of the code weight design parameter k2(q, d) is chosen to satisfy Equations (51)-(53) in Section VII, and the value
of the throughput parameter ru(p, q, d) is chosen to satisfy Claim 16 in Section VIII. We abbreviate k2(q, d) and ru(p, q, d) as
k2 and ru respectively when the arguments are clear from the context. Then we define four multivariable functions gi(u, v,w, t),
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, as
g1(u, v,w, t) = k2(u, v)
[
u(1 − w)
(
log
(
1 − u
u(1 − w)
)
+ log e
)
+ (1 − u)(1 + t)
(
log
(
u
(1 − u)(1 + t)
)
+ log e
)
− log e
]
, (5)
g2(u, v,w, t) = k2(u, v)
[
u(1 + w)
(
log
(
1 − u
u(1 + w)
)
+ log e
)
+ (1 − u)(1 + t)
(
log
(
u
(1 − u)(1 + t)
)
+ log e
)
− log e
]
, (6)
g3(u, v,w, t) = k2(u, v)
[
u(1 − w)
(
log
(
1 − u
u(1 − w)
)
+ log e
)
+ (1 − u)(1 − t)
(
log
(
u
(1 − u)(1 − t)
)
+ log e
)
− log e
]
, (7)
7Instead of using variational distance, other works (see, for example, [2], [21], [22]) also use Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to measure the covertness.
In the existing literature, people usually give equal weight to the probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection. Recently, people also
propose new metrics, such as the probability of missed detection for fixed probability of false alarm [37], to model different problem settings (for instance, the
eavesdropper wishes to completely prevent missed detection, while is willing to tolerate modest false alarm in military applications). Though we focus on
variational distance in this work, it is conceivable that our code construction is also applicable to other metrics.
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Fig. 2: This contour plot shows the decoding complexity of our concatenated code designs as a function of the code chunk length design parameter k1, as defined in Equation (9),
for various values of (p, q). Each point on a contour labelled η corresponds to a (p, q) value with decoding complexity O(nη). Our codes are only designed for the regime p < q
(less noisy channel to Bob than to Willie). As is to be expected, when p is close to q, the computational complexity is high (since the channels to both parties are similar, one has
to employ longer block-lengths to be able to utilize the slight asymmetries in the two channels, leading to correspondingly higher computational cost). Interestingly, even in the
regime when p is much smaller than q, the computational cost is also relatively high - in this regime the driving factor is the fact that a much higher covert throughput is possible,
leading to correspondingly higher computational workload.
g4(u, v,w, t) = k2(u, v)
[
u(1 + w)
(
log
(
1 − u
u(1 + w)
)
+ log e
)
+ (1 − u)(1 − t)
(
log
(
u
(1 − u)(1 − t)
)
+ log e
)
− log e
]
, (8)
The reason why we define the multivariable functions gi(u, v,w, t) will be clear in Equation (78), Section VII. Equipped with
the auxiliary tools above, we then define the code chunk length design parameter k1 as
k1 = min
∆xz10,∆
xz
11∈(0,1)
max
i∈{1,2,3}
{
ξi + δ
Φi(ru, q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11)
}
, (9)
where
Φ1(ru, q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) = ru + maxj∈{1,2,3,4}
{
g j(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11)
}
, (10)
Φ2(ru, q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) = q · k2(q, d) · f (∆xz10), (11)
Φ3(ru, q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) = (1 − q) · k2(q, d) · f (∆xz11), (12)
ξ1 =
3
2
, ξ2 = ξ3 =
1
2
, (13)
and δ is a slackness parameter that trades off the probability that a randomly chosen code is “good” with the computational
complexity for encoding and decoding. It can be chosen to be any value in the interval (0, 0.5). For correctness we set δ = 0.01
throughout this work. The parameters ∆xz10 and ∆
xz
11, to be formally defined in Section VI-A, play an critical role in our code
design. We elaborate on the reasons why ∆xz10 and ∆
xz
11 are required to satisfy (9) in Equations (83) and (109)-(112), Section VII.
The work of [17] shows that given p, q and d, one can transmit up to ru
√
n message bits per n channel uses covertly and
reliably, but the decoding complexity as well as the space complexity for storing the codebook are exponential in
√
n. Our
main result, Theorem 1 below, shows that it is possible to communicate reliably and covertly while reducing the complexity to
be polynomial in n, by using a carefully designed concatenated code Cn chosen from the concatenated code ensemble Cccn (for
notational convenience we drop the subscript n in the following) with relative throughput ru(1 − o(1)).
Theorem 1. For any 0 < p < q < 1/2 and any sufficiently small d > 0, there exists a concatenated code ensemble Ccc and a
Np,q,d such that for any n > Np,q,d , with probability super-polynomially close to one over the concatenated code ensemble C
cc,
a randomly chosen code C satisfies the following properties:
1) The relative throughput of the code r is ru
(
1 − (log n)−1/4
)
= 2d
√
q(1 − q) 1−2p1−2q
(
log
(
1−p
p
)) (
1 − (log n)−1/4
)
.
2) There exists a decoder Γ(·) such that the probability of error of the code is at most exp
(
−2√n/
(
k1(log n)2
))
.
3) The code is at least (1 − d − 4n−δ/4)-covert with respect to Willie.
4) The computational complexity of Alice’s encoding is O
(√
n log(
√
n)
)
, and that of Bob’s decoding is at most nruk1+1. The
space complexity for storing the codebook is nruk1+1.
6TABLE I: Effect of code design parameters on properties of the code
Parameter Code Property Value
k1 Chunk length k1
√
n log(n)
k2 Average weight of codewords k2
√
n
ru Throughput ru
√
n
Remark 1. a) The meaning of code parameters, as formalized in our proof, is summarized in Table I. The choice of these
parameters leads to various tradeoffs in the complexity-throughput-covertness space.
1) The parameter k1 determines the chunk length of our inner codes (which equal k1
√
n log n) — the smaller the k1, the
lower the complexity of the codes. However, making k1 too small makes proving covertness and reliability challenging.
Hence there’s an inherent tradeoff, controlled by the parameter k1, between desirable properties of the code — indeed
Equation (9) finds a “sweet spot” for k1.
2) The parameter k2 determines the covertness of our code, and the codewords in our codebook have average Hamming
weight k2
√
n — the specific choice of k2 matches that in the (computationally inefficient) code design in [17].
3) Parameters ∆xz10 and ∆
xz
11, roughly speaking, quantify the type-classes of codeword-noise pairs likeliest to cause problems
for our code design.
4) The relative throughput of our codes equals ru(1 − o(1)), which asymptotically matches that in [17].
5) The function f (·) helps analyze the atypicality of codewords, while the functions gi(·, ·, ·, ·) help analyze the covertness of
our coding scheme.
b) The encoding complexity is dominated by the complexity of Reed-Solomon encoding. The decoding complexity is dominated
by the random inner code and is an increasing function of k1. For a given value of p and q, the choice of parameters that
minimizes the overall decoding complexity is found by Equation (9). In Figure 2, we plot the optimal value of complexities for
0 < p < q < 1/2.
c) For a specific choice of (p, q), the decoding complexity is independent of the covertness parameter d, while the relative
throughput scales linearly with d.
d) Our code is proved to be (1 − d − 4n−δ/4)-covert. Note that 1 − d − 4n−δ/4 converges to 1 − d as n grows without bound.
Remark 2. As noted in the recent work by Tahmasbi and Bloch [37], the optimal values of the code weight design parameter
and the relative throughput that guarantees (1 − d)-covertness respectively equal
k∗2(q, d) =
2
√
q(1 − q)
1 − 2q · Q
−1
(
1 − d
2
)
, (14)
r∗u(p, q, d) =
2
√
q(1 − q) · Q−1
(
1−d
2
)
· (1 − 2p)
1 − 2q log
(
1 − p
p
)
, (15)
where the Q-function is defined as Q(x) = 12pi
∫ ∞
x exp
(
− u22
)
du. However, throughout this paper we follow the parameter settings
in the preliminary version of this work [1], and stick to the definitions of k2(q, d) and ru(p, q, d) in (3) and (4) respectively.
V. Code Design and Computational Complexity
In this section, we elaborate on the construction of our concatenated code. Our key technique is to use a “low-weight”
random code to guarantee covertness. To reduce the computational cost, we divide the message of length Θ(
√
n) message into
Θ(
√
n/ log n) chunks, with each chunk containing Θ(log n) message bits, and apply random inner codes to each of the chunks.
In addition, we use a Reed-Solomon code as an outer code to ensure the probability of error decays with the blocklength n.
A. Outer encoder and Inner encoders
Figure 3 illustrates the structure of the outer encoder and the inner encoders. Let L ,
√
n/(k1 log n) be the number of chunks,
and λ be the rate of the outer code, with value specified below8. For the outer RS code, we divide the length-(r
√
n) binary vector
corresponding to the message M into λL chunks M(1),M(2), . . . ,M(λL). Therefore, each chunk contains rk1 log(n)/λ message
bits. Let rˆ = rk1/λ, and we regard each chunk as a symbol over finite field F where |F| = 2rˆ log n. The encoding function of
the outer code Ψout takes the form Ψout(·) : FλL → FL, and we have Ψout
(
[M(1),M(2), . . . ,M(λL)]
)
= [W (1),W (2), . . . ,W (L)]. The
first λL chunks W (1),W (2), . . . ,W (λL) are systematic chunks while the last (1 − λ)L chunks W (λL+1), . . . ,W (L) are parity chunks,
since we use a systematic RS code as the outer code. Note that W (i) = M(i) for the systematic chunks. In this work, we set
the number of parity chunks to equal 28L/(log n), and hence the rate of the outer code λ = 1 − 28/(log n) approaches 1 as n
grows without bound. In the following, we refer to W (i) and X(i) as inner-message and inner-codeword respectively, since they
8While a detailed discussion for this precise choice of the parameter λ is best left to Section VIII, where the effect of the choice of the parameter is more
apparent, for now it suffices to think of each systematic chunk as having a vanishing probability of decoding error, and hence a vanishingly small fraction of
parity chunks sufficing to aid Bob’s decoder.
7Fig. 3: The encoder of the concatenated code: Alice first divides the message M into λL chunks M(1),M(2), . . . ,M(λL). The outer encoder (corresponding to Reed-Solomon code)
Ψout takes the λL chunks as input and outputs L chunks W (1),W (2), . . . ,W (L), where W (i) = M(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ λL. For each chunk W (i), the inner encoder Ψ(i)in (corresponding to the
randomly-generated “low-weight” inner code C(i)) takes W (i) as input and outputs an inner-codeword X(i) of this inner code. The codeword X of the concatenated code is obtained
by collecting all the L inner-codewords.
serve as the roles of “message” and “codeword” of each inner code. The length of each inner-codeword X(i) is denoted by
B , k1
√
n log n, since we have L =
√
n/(k1 log n) chunks in total.
For the i-th chunk, we use a randomly generated “low-weight” inner codes C(i), with distribution P(C(i)), to encode the
inner-message W (i). Note that here we use C(i) to denote the random variable, while using C(i) to denote its realization. The
inner code C(i) contains 2rˆ log n = nrˆ inner-codewords of length-B, with each bit of these inner-codewords chosen independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to Bernoulli(ρ), where9 ρ , k2/
√
n. For each inner-message w(i), the corresponding
inner-codeword is denoted by X(i)w , with distribution
PX(x(i)w ) = ρ
wtH (x(i)w ) · (1 − ρ)B−wtH (x(i)w ), ∀x(i)w ∈ {0, 1}B, (16)
where wtH(x(i)w ) denotes the Hamming weight of x
(i)
w . The encoder of C
(i) takes the form Ψ(i)in (·) : {0, 1}rˆ log n → {0, 1}B, and
outputs X(i)w for every inner-message w
(i).
For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, the codebooks C(i) are independently and identically distributed, and hence different chunks are
encoded by different inner codes. The probability distribution induced over concatenated codebooks generated via this process
will be denoted by P(C). By collecting all the L inner-codewords, we obtain the codeword X = [X(1),X(2), . . . ,X(L)].
B. Outer decoder and Inner decoder
Bob first partitions the channel outputs Y into L vectors [Y(1),Y(2), . . . ,Y(L)], where for each i the length-B vector Y(i)
corresponds to the set of channel outputs Y(i−1)B+1, . . . ,YiB. The i-th inner decoder takes Y(i) as input and reconstructs Wˆ (i) by
using the decoding function Γ(i)in (·) : {0, 1}B → {0, 1}rˆ log n. Bob then treats each reconstructed inner-message Wˆ (i) as a symbol
over finite field F, and reconstructs Mˆ using the decoder for a systematic RS code.
C. Space complexity and Computational complexity
1) Space complexity: We need to store all the inner codebooks since random codes serve as the inner codes. An inner code
C(i) contains nrˆ inner-codewords of length-B, hence the space complexity for storing a single inner codebook is Bnrˆ bits. Note
that the concatenated code C contains L inner codes. Therefore, for sufficiently large n, the total space complexity is bounded
from above by
Bnrˆ · L = nrˆ+1 ≤ nk1ru+1, (17)
where inequality (17) follows since BL = n and
rˆ =
rk1
λ
=
ru
(
1 − (log n)− 14
)
k1
λ
= k1ru
1 − (log n)− 14
1 − (28/ log n) ≤ k1ru. (18)
2) Computational complexity for encoding: We first consider the computational complexity of the outer RS encoder. A
clever way to implement the RS encoder is to perform a Fast Fourier Transform over the finite field F [38]. Such encoding
process requires O(L log L log |F|) = O(√n log(√n)) binary operations, since L = √n/(k1 log n), |F| = 2rˆ log n, and rˆ ≤ k1ru. Next,
it is worth noting that the computational complexity of the inner encoders is negligible since the inner codebooks are stored in
the storage.
9Note that in this work, the parameter ρ scales as Θ(n−1/2), while the code weight design parameter k2 scales as a constant.
83) Computational complexity for decoding: As usual in information theory, our decoding rule for each inner code follows
from the typicality decoding. In the worst case, each inner decoder needs to look through the whole inner codebook, and hence
the computational complexity of the inner decoders equals the total space complexity. Moreover, the complexity of the best
known RS decoder is given by O(L2 log L log |F|) [39], which is negligible compared with that of the inner decoders. Therefore,
the overall computational complexity for decoding is at most nk1ru+1.
VI. Definitions and Probability Distributions of Interest
Since much of the analysis in this work is based on a “chunk-wise” manner, most of the notations and definitions introduced
in this section correspond to a single chunk i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
A. Definitions used for covertness
• For any inner-codeword x(i) and Willie’s channel outputs z(i), the fraction of (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) pairs in (x(i), z(i))
are respectively denoted by f xz00 (x
(i), z(i)), f xz01 (x
(i), z(i)), f xz10 (x
(i), z(i)) and f xz11 (x
(i), z(i)), with
f xzab (x
(i), z(i)) ,
∣∣∣∣ j ∈ {1, . . . , B} : (x(i)j , z(i)j ) = (a, b)∣∣∣∣
B
, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ {0, 1}, (19)
where x(i)j and z
(i)
j are the j-th elements of x
(i) and z(i), and B is the length of x(i) and z(i).
• The fractional Hamming weight of the inner-codeword x(i) is denoted by
f x1 (x
(i)) ,
wtH(x(i))
B
. (20)
Note that f x1 (x
(i)) = f xz10 (x
(i), z(i)) + f xz11 (x
(i), z(i)) by definition. If, as will be the case in this work, each bit of each
inner-codeword is chosen to equal 1 with probability ρ, then the expected value of f x1 (x
(i)) equals ρ.
• The fractional Hamming weight of Willie’s channel outputs z(i) is denoted by
f z1 (z
(i)) ,
wtH(z(i))
B
. (21)
Note that f z1 (z
(i)) = f xz01 (x
(i), z(i)) + f xz11 (x
(i), z(i)) by definition. The expected value of f z1 (z
(i)) when T = 1 equals ρ ∗ q =
ρ(1 − q) + q(1 − ρ), since f x1 (x(i)) and f x0 (x(i)) equal ρ and (1 − ρ) respectively, and the channel between Alice and Willie is
a BSC(q).
For notational convenience we henceforth abbreviate f xzab (x
(i), z(i)), f x1 (x
(i)), f z1 (z
(i)) as f zab, f
x
1 , f
z
1 respectively (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}),
when the arguments are clear from the context.
When Alice is transmitting (T = 1), the random variable Z is drawn from a Bernoulli(ρ ∗ q) distribution. We then define the
B-letter typical set of Z when T = 1 as10
ABZ ,
{
z(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f z1 (z(i)) ∈
[
(ρ ∗ q) · (1 ± ∆z1)
]}
. (22)
Remark 3. Even though the elements of ABZ defined in Equation (22) are labelled as z(i), the definition of this set does not
depend on the i-th chunk. In fact, ABZ can be used to classify not only Willie’s channel outputs of the i-th chunk z(i), but also any
length-B vector with “typical” fractional Hamming weight. Similar remarks also apply to the definitions of other (conditional)
typical sets in this Section.
By choosing ∆z1 carefully, we ensure that such a narrow typical set is a high probability set (as is usually the case in
information-theoretic proofs), and is also as “narrow” as possible (includes as few type-classes as possible — this turns out to
be important since extremal type-classes in the narrow typical set dominate the performance of our codes). It can be seen via
standard arguments that if ∆z1 were to decay as o(n
−1/4), then the corresponding set A1n(Z) would have a vanishing probability
mass — scaling ∆z1 as O(n
−1/4) results in the “narrowest” possible typical set. In this work, we choose ∆z1 to scale as n
−1/4+δ/2,
where the slackness parameter δ (chosen in the range (0, 0.5)) allows one to show sufficiently tight concentration of probability.
In addition, we also partition the typical set ABZ into many type classes. The B-letter type class of Z (of fractional Hamming
weight f z1 ) is defined as
T BZ ( f z1 ) ,
{
z(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f z1 (z(i)) = f z1
}
. (23)
We define the set of typical fractional Hamming weight of Z as
F zB ,
{
f z1 :
f z1 ∈
[
(ρ ∗ q)(1 ± ∆z1)
]
B f z1 ∈ Z
}
, (24)
10For notational convenience, we use [a ± b] to denote an interval [a − b, a + b] ⊂ R.
9hence the B-letter typical set of Z can be represented as the union of “typical” type classes, i.e., ABZ = ∪ f z1∈F zB T BZ ( f z1 ). Moreover,
for a given z(i), we define the B-letter conditionally typical set of X as
ABX|z(i) ,
x(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f xz10 (x(i), z(i)) ∈
[
ρq(1 ± ∆xz10)
]
f xz11 (x
(i), z(i)) ∈
[
ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11)
]  , (25)
where ∆xz10 and ∆
xz
11 scale as constants in the interval (0, 1) (with values to be specified later, in Section VII — indeed, careful
choice of these two parameters turns out to be critical for our code design). The B-letter conditionally typical set can further be
decomposed to many conditional type classes. Given z(i), the B-letter conditional type class of X is defined as
T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 ) ,
x(i) ∈ {0, 1}B :
∣∣∣ j : (x(i)j , z(i)j ) = (1, 0)∣∣∣ = B f xz10∣∣∣ j : (x(i)j , z(i)j ) = (1, 0)∣∣∣ = B f xz10
 , (26)
Let the set of typical fractional Hamming weight with respect to Willie be
F xzB ,
( f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 ) :
f xz10 ∈
[
ρq(1 ± ∆xz10)
]
f xz11 ∈
[
ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11)
]
B f xz10 ∈ Z
B f xz11 ∈ Z
 , (27)
and we have ABX|z(i) = ∪( f xz10 , f xz11 )∈F xzB T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 ).
B. Definitions used for reliability
• For any inner-codeword x(i) and Bob’s channel outputs y(i), the fraction of (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) pairs in (x(i), y(i))
are respectively denoted by f xy00 (x
(i), y(i)), f xy01 (x
(i), y(i)), f xy10 (x
(i), y(i)) and f xy11 (x
(i), y(i)), with
f xyab (x
(i), y(i)) ,
∣∣∣∣ j ∈ {1, . . . , B} : (x(i)j , y(i)j ) = (a, b)∣∣∣∣
B
, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ {0, 1}. (28)
• The fractional Hamming weight of Bob’s channel outputs y(i) is denoted by
f y1 (y
(i)) ,
wtH(y(i))
B
. (29)
The expected value of f y1 (y
(i)) equals p when T = 0, and equals ρ ∗ p when T = 1. We abbreviate f xyab (x(i), y(i)) and f y1 (y(i)) as
f xyab and f
y
1 respectively (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}), when the arguments are clear from the context.
When Alice is silent (T = 0), the random variable Y is drawn from a Bernoulli(p) distribution. Hence we define the B-letter
typical set of Y when T = 0 as
AB,(0)Y ,
{
y(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f y1 (y(i)) ∈
[
p(1 ± ∆y1)
]}
. (30)
When Alice is transmitting (T = 1), the random variable Y is drawn from a Bernoulli(ρ ∗ p) distribution. We then define the
B-letter typical set of Y when T = 1 as
ABY ,
{
y(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f y1 (y(i)) ∈
[
(ρ ∗ p)(1 ± ∆y1)
]}
. (31)
The parameter ∆y1 is set to be n
−1/4+δ/2 in the following proof11. For a given y(i), the B-letter conditionally typical set of X
when T = 1 is defined as
ABX|y(i) ,
x(i) ∈ {0, 1}B : f xy10 (x(i), y(i)) ∈
[
ρp(1 ± ∆xy10)
]
f xy11 (x
(i), y(i)) ∈
[
ρ(1 − p)(1 ± ∆xy11)
]  , (32)
where ∆xy10 and ∆
xy
11 scale as (log n)
−1/3. The scalings of ∆xy10 and ∆
xy
11, which are analyzed in Claim 15, guarantee simultaneously
that the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) is a high probability set, and yet is also as “narrow” as possible. We then define the
B-letter conditional type class of X given y(i) as
T BX|y(i) ( f xy10 , f xy11 ) ,
x(i) ∈ {0, 1}B :
∣∣∣ j : (x(i)j , y(i)j ) = (1, 0)∣∣∣ = B f xy10∣∣∣ j : (x(i)j , y(i)j ) = (1, 0)∣∣∣ = B f xy10
 , (33)
11The reason for this scaling is as in Section VII-A for ∆z1.
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and the set of typical fractional Hamming weight with respect to Bob as
F xyB ,
( f
xy
10 , f
xy
11 ) :
f xy10 ∈
[
ρp(1 ± ∆xy10)
]
f xy11 ∈
[
ρ(1 − p)(1 ± ∆xy11)
]
B f xy10 ∈ Z
B f xy11 ∈ Z
 . (34)
Therefore, the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) can be represented as ABX|y(i) = ∪( f xy10 , f xy11 )∈F xyB T BX|y(i) ( f
xy
10 , f
xy
11 ).
C. Probability distributions of interest
The proof of covertness essentially connects to the analysis of the distributions of Willie’s channel outputs. We now introduce
related distributions that are used in the proof. As noted in Section V, each inner code comprises of nrˆ inner-codewords, each
of length B. The probability that an inner-message w(i) is transmitted equals 1/nrˆ.
Remark 4. We follow the convention that the message M is uniformly distributed, and this directly implies the inner-message
w(i) for systematic chunks is also uniformly distributed. Moreover, in Appendix E we show that Reed-Solomon codes also ensure
the uniformity of the inner-message w(i) for parity chunks.
The probability P(z(i)|x(i)) that a transmitted inner-codeword x(i) gets pushed by the Bernoulli(q) noise on the channel to
Willie to the channel outputs z(i), at Hamming distance dH(x(i), z(i)) from x(i), equals qdH (x
(i),z(i))(1− q)B−dH (x(i),z(i)). Hence, if T = 1,
the B-letter active distribution P(i)1 of Willie’s channel outputs Z
(i) on chunk i, which depends on the particular inner code C(i),
is given as
P(i)1 (z
(i)) =
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) =
1
nrˆ
∑
w(i)
qdH (x
(i)
w ,z
(i))(1 − q)B−dH (x(i)w ,z(i)). (35)
Next, we consider the active distribution of Willie’s channel outputs Z(i) averaged over the inner code design. The B-letter
ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1
)
is given as
EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (z
(i))
)
=
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) =
1
nrˆ
∑
w(i)
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (36)
=
1
nrˆ
∑
w(i)
∑
x(i)w ∈{0,1}B
PX(x(i)w )P(z
(i)|x(i)w ) (37)
=
∑
x(i)∈{0,1}B
PX(x(i))P(z(i)|x(i)), (38)
where (37) holds since P(z(i)|x(i)w ) only depends on the inner-codeword x(i)w , and (38) is obtained by noting that
∑
x(i)w PX(x
(i)
w )P(z
(i)|x(i)w )
are the same for different w(i) (hence we use a generic symbol x(i) in (38)). Using the definitions of PX(x(i)) and P(z(i)|x(i))
above, it can be seen that this corresponds to a Binomial(n, n(ρ ∗ q)) distribution, with
EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (z
(i))
)
= (ρ ∗ q)wtH (z(i))(1 − (ρ ∗ q))B−wtH (z(i)). (39)
Note that this can be viewed as passing the all-zero codeword through two successive BSCs, with crossover probabilities
respectively ρ and q. The ensemble-averaged distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1
)
itself has a relatively simple description, even though for
specific codes P(i)1 has a complicated dependence on the inner codebook C
(i). Indeed, this distribution plays a critical role in the
following proof. The B-letter innocent distribution P(i)0 on Willie’s channel outputs is, in contrast, a Binomial(n, nq) distribution,
with
P(i)0 (z
(i)) = qwtH (z
(i))(1 − q)B−wtH (z(i)). (40)
VII. Proof of Covertness
Theorem 1 states that for any sufficiently small d > 0, the code we construct is (1− d − 4n−δ/4)-covert with high probability.
As discussed in Section III, the code is deemed to be (1 − d − 4n−δ/4)-covert if the variational distance between the innocent
distribution P0 and the active distribution P1 is bounded from above as V(P0, P1) ≤ d + 4n−δ/4. Note that ∀z ∈ {0, 1}n,
P0(z) = qwtH (z)(1 − q)n−wtH (z), (41)
P1(z) =
∑
m∈{1,...,N}
1
N
P(z|xm), (42)
where xm is the length-n codeword corresponding to the message m, and 1/N is the probability that a message m is transmitted.
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TABLE II: Table of Parameters
Symbol Description Equality/Range Section
M Message M ∈ {1, . . . ,N} Section III
T Transmission status T ∈ {0, 1} Section III
Xm Codeword of message m Xm ∈ {0, 1}n Section III
C Concatenated code C = {Xm}Nm=1 Section IV
Y/Z Bob’s/Willie’s channel outputs Y,Z ∈ {0, 1}n Section III
Ny/Nz Noise vector from Alice to Bob/Willie Ny,Nz ∈ {0, 1}n Section III
p Crossover probability of BSC (Alice to Bob) p ∈ [0, 0.5] Section I
q Crossover probability of BSC (Alice to Willie) q ∈ [0, 0.5] Section I
d Parameter of covertness 0 < d < 1 Section III
P0(Z) Innocent distribution of Z (T = 0) Section III
P1(Z) Active distribution of Z under code C (T = 1) Section III
EC(P1(Z)) Ensemble-averaged active distribution of Z (T = 1) Term (43), Section VII
Ψ(·) Encoder Ψ(·) : {0} ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,N} → {0, 1}n Section III
Γ(·) Bob’s decoder Γ(·) : {0, 1}n → {0} ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,N} Section III
Φ(·) Willie’s estimator Φ(·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} Section III
α(Φ) Probability of false alarm α(Φ) = PNz (Tˆ = 1|T = 0) Section III
β(Φ) Probability of missed detection β(Φ) = PM,Nz (Tˆ = 0|T = 1) Section III
k1 Code chunk length design parameter Term (9), Section IV
B Chunk length B = k1
√
n log n Section V-A
k2 Code weight design parameter k2 = 2d
√
q(1 − q)/(1 − 2q) Term (3), Section IV
ρ Average fraction of 1’s in codewords ρ = k2/
√
n Section V-A
ru Maximal relative throughput ru = 2d
√
q(1 − q) 1−2p1−2q log
( 1−p
p
)
Term (4), Section IV
r Relative throughput of the concatenated code r = (logN)/
√
n = ru(1 − (log n)−1/3) Section III
L Number of chunks L =
√
n/(k1 log n) Section V-A
λ Rate of the outer code λ = 1 − 28/(log n) Section V-A
δ Slackness parameter δ = 0.01 Section IV
rˆ “Relative throughput” of an inner code rˆ = rk1/λ Section V-A
F Finite field of the outer RS code |F| = 2rˆ log n Section V-A
W(i) Inner-message of the i-th chunk W(i) ∈ {0, 1}rˆ log n Section V-A
X(i)w Inner-codeword of w
(i) X(i)w ∈ {0, 1}B Section V-A
C(i) Inner code for the i-th chunk C(i) = {X(i)w }n
rˆ
w=1 Section V-A
Y(i)/Z(i) Bob’s/Willie’s channel outputs of the i-th chunk Y(i) ∈ {0, 1}B /Z(i) ∈ {0, 1}B Section V-A
P(i)1 (Z
(i)) B-letter active distribution of Z(i) under C(i) Term (35), Section VI-C
EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (Z
(i))
)
B-letter ensemble-averaged active distribution of Z(i) Term (39), Section VI-C
f xzab (x
(i), z(i))/ f xyab (x
(i), y(i)) Fraction of pair-(a, b) in (x(i), z(i))/(x(i), y(i)), a, b ∈ {0, 1} Sections VI-A, VI-B
f x1 (x
(i))/ f y1 (y
(i))/ f z1 (z
(i)) Fractional Hamming weight of x(i)/y(i)/z(i) Sections VI-A, VI-B
ABZ /ABY B-letter typical set of Z/Y (T = 1) Sections VI-A, VI-B
AB,(0)Y B-letter typical set of Y (T = 0) Term (30), Section VI-B
AB
X|z(i) /ABX|y(i) B-letter conditionally typical set of X given z(i)/y(i) Sections VI-A, VI-B
F xzB /F xyB Set of typical fractional Hamming weight Sections VI-A, VI-B
T B
X|z(i) ( f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 )/T BX|y(i) ( f
xy
10 , f
xy
11 ) B-letter conditional type class of X given z
(i)/y(i) Sections VI-A, VI-B
τ(i) Oracle revealed information of the i-th chunk Section VII-B
l1 Number of systematic chunks l1 = λL Section VII-B
l2 Number of parity chunks l2 = L(1 − λ) Section VII-B
(W(1), . . . ,W(l1)) Systematic inner-message vector Section VII-B
(W(l1+1), . . . ,W(L)) Parity inner-message vector Section VII-B
The n-letter ensemble-averaged active distribution of Z is denoted by EC (P1), such that the following holds for all z ∈ {0, 1}n,
EC(P1)(z) =
∑
C
P(C)
∑
m∈{1,...,N}
1
N
P(z|xm) =
1
N
∑
m∈{1,...,N}
∑
C(1)
P(C(1))P(z(1)|x(1)wm ) · · ·
∑
C(L)
P(C(L))P(z(L)|x(L)wm ) (43)
=
1
N
∑
m∈{1,...,N}
∑
x(1)wm∈{0,1}B
PX(x(1)wm )P(z
(1)|x(1)wm ) · · ·
∑
x(L)wm∈{0,1}B
PX(x(L)wm )P(z
(L)|x(L)wm ) (44)
=
∑
x(1)∈{0,1}B
PX(x(1))P(z(1)|x(1)) · · ·
∑
x(L)∈{0,1}B
PX(x(L))P(z(L)|x(L)) (45)
= EC(1)
(
P(1)1 (z
(1))
)
· · ·EC(L)
(
P(L)1 (z
(L))
)
(46)
= (ρ ∗ q)wtH (z)(1 − (ρ ∗ q))n−wtH (z). (47)
Equation (43) is obtained by assuming the message m is encoded to (w(1)m , . . . ,w
(L)
m ), and the channel from Alice to Willie
is memoryless. Equation (44) holds since for a fixed m, the only random variables of interest are (X(1)wm , . . . ,X
(L)
wm
) — the
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inner-codewords of the message m. Equation (45) is due to the fact that the term∑
x(1)wm∈{0,1}B
PX(x(1)wm )P(z
(1)|x(1)wm ) · · ·
∑
x(L)wm∈{0,1}B
PX(x(L)wm )P(z
(L)|x(L)wm ) (48)
is the same for every m, hence we use generic symbols x(1), . . . , x(L) in (45). Equation (46) follows from the definition of the
B-letter ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (z
(i))
)
in (38), and Equation (47) follows from (39). Since variational
distance satisfies the triangle inequality, we have
V(P0, P1) ≤ V(P0,EC(P1)) + V(EC(P1), P1), (49)
Following the approach in [17], to prove that the proposed code is covert, it suffices to show that
• (i) V(P0,EC(P1)) ≤ d + n−δ/4,
• (ii) With high probability over the concatenated code design, V(EC(P1), P1) ≤ 3n−δ/4.
A flow-chart of the proof of covertness can be found in Figure 4. As in [17], the proof of (i) follows fairly directly from
relatively standard information-theoretic inequalities. For completeness, we repeat the proof here.
Lemma 2. [17] Let the code weight design parameter k2 =
2d
√
q(1−q)
1−2q , as n grows without bound, we have
V (P0,EC (P1)) ≤ d + n−δ/4. (50)
Proof:
V (P0,EC (P1)) ≤
√
ln 2
2
D (P0 ‖ EC (P1)) (51)
=
√
n ln 2
2
D (q ‖ ρ ∗ q) (52)
≤
√
n ln 2
2
(
ρ2 (1 − 2q)2
2q (1 − q) ln 2 + O(ρ
3)
)
. (53)
In Equation (51), we use Pinsker’s inequality to bound the variational distance in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence,
where D(P0 ‖ EC(P1)) , ∑z∈{0,1}n P0(z) log P0(z)EC(P1)(z) . Equation (52) follows from the chain rule, since both P0 and EC(P1)
correspond to n-letter sequences drawn i.i.d. from Bernoulli(q) and Bernoulli(ρ ∗ q) distributions respectively. Equation (53)
follows by taking the Taylor series expansion for KL Divergence, as in [17, Claim 13], resulting in
D(q ‖ ρ ∗ q) ≤ ρ
2(1 − 2q)2
2q(1 − q) ln 2 + O(ρ
3). (54)
By choosing ρ = k2√n =
2d
√
q(1−q)
(1−2q)√n , as n grows without bound, we have V (P0,EC (P1)) ≤ d + O(n−1/4) ≤ d + n−δ/4. 
It is worth noting that the Pinsker’s inequality used in the proof of Lemma 2 is not tight. As discussed in Remark 2, choosing
the code weight design parameter k2 to be
2
√
q(1−q)
1−2q · Q−1
(
1−d
2
)
still guarantees V (P0,EC (P1)) ≤ d + n−δ/4.
We now proceed to one of the major parts of our proof (proof of (ii)) — showing that with high probability over the choice
of the inner codes, the variational distance between the active distribution P1 (which depends on the specific inner codes
chosen) and the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(P1) is small. As mentioned in Section II, this is considerably more
challenging in our setting of concatenated codes comprising of multiple chunks, than in the setting of [17] and other works
wherein a single n-letter code is used. By the definition of variational distance, we have
V(EC(P1), P1) =
1
2
∑
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣EC(P1(z)) − P1(z)∣∣∣ (55)
=
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ (56)
≤ 1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ (57)
+
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ . (58)
In Equation (58) above, the first term corresponds to the variational distance between the n-letter active distribution P1 on Z, and
a corresponding “chunk-wise independent” product distribution denoted by P(1)1 P
(2)
1 · · · P(L)1 ; and the second term corresponds to
the variational distance between the n-letter ensemble-averaged distribution EC(P1) on Z, and the same product distribution (the
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Fig. 4: A road-map of our proof that our codes are covert with high probability.
inequality follows from the triangle inequality). This product distribution corresponds to the distribution that Willie would see if
he were to “assume” that the distribution on Z splits as a product of independent distributions on Z(1),Z(2), . . . ,Z(L). There is
of course no reason for this to be the case, especially since Alice is using a code that introduces correlations between chunks,
but introducing such a “proxy” distribution and computing variational distributions with respect to it is a useful analytical tool.
Intuitively, for a highly covert concatenated code, the product distribution P(1)1 P
(2)
1 · · · P(L)1 should be “close” to both the active
distribution P1, and the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(P1). Indeed, this is what we show below. We prove Lemma 3
and Lemma 4 in Section VII-A and Section VII-B respectively, and conclude the proof of covertness in Section VII-C.
Lemma 3. With probability at least 1 − √n exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the concatenated code design, for the randomly chosen code C,
the variational distance between the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(P1) and the “chunk-wise independent” product
distribution P(1)1 P
(2)
1 · · · P(L)1 is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ ≤ n− δ4 .
Lemma 4. With probability at least 1 − exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the concatenated code design and the channel noise to Willie,
for the randomly chosen code C, the variational distance between the n-letter active distribution P1(Z(1), . . . ,Z(L)) and the
“chunk-wise independent” product distribution P(1)1 (Z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (Z(L)) is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ ≤ 2n− δ4 .
A. Proof of Lemma 3:
We first observe that the variational distance between the ensemble-averaged active distribution and the “chunk-wise
independent” product distribution is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ (59)
=
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(1) (P(1)1 (z(1))) · · ·EC(L) (P(L)1 (z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ (60)
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≤ 1
2
L∑
i=1
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣ . (61)
Note that (60) has been proved in (46), and (61) is obtained by using the triangle inequality repeatedly. We now follow the
lead of the analysis in [17] by replicating the analysis there in a chunk-wise manner. Specifically, for each chunk i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
we break up 12
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣, the variational distance between P(i)1 and EC(i) (P(i)1 ), as
1
2
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (62)
+
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (63)
+
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (64)
≤ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (65)
+
1
2
EC(i)

∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 + 12EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 (66)
+
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) +
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)). (67)
The calculation above partitions the variational distance between the active distribution P(i)1 and the ensemble-averaged active
distribution EC(i) (P
(i)
1 ) into three components. The term in (62) corresponds to the variational distance between P
(i)
1 and EC(i) (P
(i)
1 )
contributed by typical z(i) and conditionally typical x(i). The term in (63) corresponds to the variational distance contributed by
typical z(i) and conditionally atypical x(i). The term in (64) corresponds to the variational distance contributed by atypical z(i).
Moreover, we bound (63) and (64) from above by the triangle inequality, and thus obtain the terms in (66) and (67). In the
following, we will show that each term in (65), (66), (67) asymptotically vanishes (each term decreases faster than Θ(1/
√
n))
with high probability over the inner code design.
Claim 5 (Term in (65)). With probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the inner code design, the randomly chosen inner
code C(i) satisfies
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n−1/2−δ/4,
for all large enough values of n.
Proof: We first formulate the probability (averaged over the inner code design) of one specific typical z(i) induced by
conditionally typical x(i). One key step is to decompose the conditionally typical set ABX|z(i) into the typical conditional type
classes T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 ) that comprise it, and then calculate the number of inner-codewords falling into each type class.∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (68)
=
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB

∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈T BX|z(i) ( f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 )
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (69)
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=
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) ·
∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣ (70)
=
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) · EC(i)
(∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) (71)
=
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) · PX(i)
(
X(i) ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )
)
· ∣∣∣C(i)∣∣∣ . (72)
To obtain Equation (69), we decompose the conditionally typical set into the typical conditional type classes that comprise
it. Equation (70) follows since P(z(i)|x(i)w ) are identical for all w(i) such that their corresponding inner-codewords x(i)w are in
the same conditional type class ( f xz10 , f
xz
11 ), and we then use P(z
(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) to denote this channel transition probability, and
interchange the order of summations to obtain Equation (71). Equation (72) follows by noting that the expected number of
inner-codewords x(i) in chunk i falling into a type class T BX|z(i) equals the probability (averaged over the inner code design) of a
single inner-codeword in chunk i falling into the type class T BX|z(i) times the size |C(i)| of the inner codebook for chunk i. We
now bound from below the probability of a single inner-codeword falling into a specific type class as follows:
PX(i)
(
X(i) ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )
)
=
(
B
(
f xz01 + f
xz
11
)
B f xz11
)
ρB f
xz
11 (1 − ρ)B f xz01
(
B
(
f xz00 + f
xz
10
)
B f xz10
)
ρB f
xz
10 (1 − ρ)B f xz00 (73)
≥ 1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · 2
B( f xz01+ f
xz
11 )H
(
f xz11
f xz01+ f
xz
11
)
+B( f xz00+ f
xz
10 )H
(
f xz10
f xz00+ f
xz
10
)
ρB( f
xz
10+ f
xz
11)(1 − ρ)B( f xz00+ f xz01) (74)
=
1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · 2
B( f xz01+ f
xz
11 )H
(
f xz11
f xz01+ f
xz
11
)
+B( f xz00+ f
xz
10 )H
(
f xz10
f xz00+ f
xz
10
)
+B( f xz10+ f xz11) log ρ+B( f xz00+ f xz01) log(1−ρ) (75)
=
1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · 2
−B[I(x(i);z(i))+D(x(i)‖ρ)] (76)
=
1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · n
−k1 √n[I(x(i);z(i))+D(x(i)‖ρ)] (77)
Equation (73) equals the probability that X(i) falls into one type class T BX|z(i) , based on standard counting arguments. In
Equation (74), we bound the binomial coefficients by the inequality
(
n
k
)
≥
√
1
2pik2
nH( kn ), which is derived from Stirling’s
approximation. In (76), the term I(x(i); z(i)) ,
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}×{0,1} f xzab log
f xzab
f xa · f zb is the empirical mutual information between x
(i) and
z(i), and D(x(i) ‖ ρ) , f x0 log
f x0
1−ρ + f
x
1 log
f x1
ρ
is the empirical KL divergence between x(i) and the code design parameter ρ. Note
that I(x(i); z(i)) is a function of the triplet ( f z1 , f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 ), and D
(
x(i) ‖ ρ
)
is a function of the pair ( f xz10 , f
xz
11 ). The range of f
z
1 ,
f xz10 , and f
xz
11 are the intervals
[
(ρ ∗ q)(1 ± ∆z1)
]
,
[
ρq(1 ± ∆xz10)
]
, and
[
ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11)
]
respectively since we only consider typical
z(i) and the conditionally typical inner-codewords x(i) here. In Equation (77), we substitute the value of B as k1
√
n(log n).
To figure out the value of ( f z1 , f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 ) that maximizes I(x
(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ), we take partial derivatives of I(x(i); z(i))
and D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f z1 , f xz10 and f xz11 in Appendix B. It turns out that for different value of q, the maximal value
of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) is attained at different points. Though we do not derive the specific value of ( f z1 , f xz10 , f xz11 ) that
maximizes I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ), in Appendix B we can still make sure that the maximum is attained at one of the four
“corner points” given by f z1 = ρ ∗ q, f xz10 = ρq(1 ± ∆xz10) and f xz11 = ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11). In Appendix C, we prove that there exists an
explicitly computable constant c1 such that for sufficiently large n,
−k1
√
n
[
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
]
≥ k1 ·
(
max
i∈{1,2,3,4}
{gi(q, d,∆xz10,∆xz11)} + c1n−1/2
)
, (78)
where the auxiliary functions gi(·, ·, ·, ·) are defined in (5)-(8), Section IV. Recall that as specified in Section V-A, the size of
the codebook C(i) equals 2rˆ log n, where
rˆ =
ru(1 − (log n)−1/4)k1
λ
= k1ru
1 − (log n)−1/4
1 − (28/ log n) ≥ k1
(
ru − c2(log n)−1/4
)
, (79)
for some constant c2 > 0. Hence substituting (77), (78), (79) into (72) yields that the expected number of inner-codewords x(i)
falling into the type-class T BX|z(i) equals
EC(i)
(∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) = PX(i) (X(i) ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )) · ∣∣∣C(i)∣∣∣ (80)
16
≥ 1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · n
−k1 √n[I(x(i);z(i))+D(x(i)‖ρ)] · nk1(ru−c2(log n)−1/4) (81)
≥ 1
2pik1k2
√
q(1 − q) log n · n
k1[ru+maxi∈{1,2,3,4}{gi(q,d ,∆xz10,∆xz11)}−c2(log n)−1/4+c1n−1/2]. (82)
≥ nk1[ru+maxi∈{1,2,3,4}{gi(q,d ,∆xz10,∆xz11)}]− δ2 , (83)
where (83) is true for sufficiently large n, and δ = 0.01 is the slackness parameter first defined in Section IV. The code
chunk length design parameter k1 is chosen to satisfy Equations (9), (10) and (13), and in turn guarantees that k1ru +
k1max j∈{1,2,3,4} g j(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) ≥ 3/2 + δ. Therefore, we have
EC(i)
(∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) ≥ n 32 + δ2 . (84)
By the Chernoff bound12 [40], the actual number of inner-codewords falling into one type class is tightly concentrated around
its expectation, i.e.,
PC(i)
[∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣ ∈ (1 ± 2n− 12− δ4 )EC(i) (∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣)] = 1 − 2 exp (−4√n/3). (85)
Returning now to estimating the term in (65), we thus conclude that with probability (over the inner code design) at least
1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
,
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (86)
≤ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) ·
∣∣∣∣∣EC(i) (∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) − ∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (87)
≤ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) · 2n−
1
2− δ4EC(i)
(∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) (88)
≤ n− 12− δ4 . (89)
The reasons for inequalities (87)-(89) are as follows. Analogously to the decomposition in Equations (69)-(72), to obtain
Equation (87), we decompose the conditionally typical set ABX|z(i) into the summation over all the conditional type class
T BX|z(i)( f xz10 , f xz11 ). Equation (88) follows from the fact, stated in (85), that the number of inner-codewords falling into one
conditional type class is tightly concentrated around its expectation. Equation (89) holds since∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) · EC(i)
(∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣) (90)
=
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)| f xz10 , f xz11 ) ·
∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 )∣∣∣∣ (91)
=
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
( f xz10 , f
xz
11 )∈F xzB
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈T BX|z(i) ( f
xz
10 , f
xz
11 )
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (92)
≤
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
z(i)
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (93)
= 1. (94)
We interchange the order of summations in Equation (91). Inequality (93) is obtained by dropping the requirements that z(i) is
typical and x(i) is conditionally typical. This completes the proof of Claim 5. 
In the following, we show that as n grows without bound, the probability (averaged over the inner code design) of receiving
an atypical z(i) goes to zero, and the probability (averaged over the inner code design) that a typical z(i) is received and a
conditionally atypical inner-codeword x(i) is transmitted also goes to zero. We choose ∆z1 as n
−1/4+δ/2 (recall that ∆z1 is the
parameter, defined in Section VI, specifying the “width” of the narrow typical set A1B(Z)).
12We state the version of the Chernoff bound we used here (and throughout this paper) in Appendix A, since there are many different versions of the
Chernoff bound in the literature.
17
Claim 6 (Second term in (66)). The probability (averaged over the inner code design) of receiving an atypical z(i) is bounded
from above as
EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 ≤ 2 exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ q)
3
nδ log n
)
.
Proof: Note that the ensemble-averaged distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (Z
(i))
)
is a Bernoulli(ρ ∗ q) distribution, since it corresponds to
an inner-codeword x(i) being chosen according to a Bernoulli(ρ) distribution, and then X(i) passing through a BSC(q). The
probability that a Z(i) generated in this manner is atypical, i.e., the type-class f z1 falls outside the range [(ρ ∗ q)(1 ± ∆z1)], is at
most 2 exp
(
− k1(ρ∗q)3 nδ log n
)
by the Chernoff bound, since the value of ∆z1 is chosen as n
−1/4+δ/2. More specifically, we have
EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 = PC(i),W (i),Nz (Z(i) < ABZ) (95)
= PC(i),W (i),Nz
(
f z1 (Z
(i)) <
[
(1 ± ∆z1)ρ ∗ q
])
(96)
= 2 exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ q)
3
nδ log n
)
. (97)

Claim 7 (First term in (66)). The probability (averaged over the inner code design) that a typical z(i) is received and a
conditionally atypical inner-codeword x(i) is transmitted is bounded from above as
EC(i)

∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 ≤ 4n− 12− δ2 .
Proof: We rewrite the first term in (66) as
EC(i)
∑
z(i)
∑
w(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )1
{
z(i) ∈ ABZ , x(i)w < ABX|z(i)
} (98)
=
1
nrˆ
∑
w(i)
∑
x(i)w ∈{0,1}B
PX(x(i)w )
∑
z(i)
P(z(i)|x(i)w )1
{
z(i) ∈ ABZ , x(i)w < ABX|z(i)
}
(99)
=
∑
x(i)∈{0,1}B
∑
z(i)
PX(x(i))P(z(i)|x(i))1
{
z(i) ∈ ABZ , x(i) < ABX|z(i)
}
(100)
= PX(i)Z(i)
(
Z(i) ∈ ABZ ,X(i) < ABX|Z(i)
)
(101)
≤ PX(i)Z(i)
(
X(i) < AB
X|Z(i)
)
(102)
= PX(i)Z(i)
({
f xz10 (X
(i),Z(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xz10)ρq, (1 + ∆xz10)ρq
]}⋃{
f xz11 (X
(i),Z(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xz11)ρ(1 − q), (1 + ∆xz11)ρ(1 − q)
]})
. (103)
Equation (99) follows since for each w(i), the only random variable of interests is X(i)w . We use the generic symbol x
(i) starting
from (100) since the term in (100) is exactly the same for each w(i). By the standard counting arguments, we obtain
PX(i)Z(i)
({
f xz10 (X
(i),Z(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xz10)ρq, (1 + ∆xz10)ρq
]}⋃{
f xz11 (X
(i),Z(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xz11)ρ(1 − q), (1 + ∆xz11)ρ(1 − q)
]})
≤
k1
√
n log n∑
i1=k1k2q(log n)(1+∆xz10)
(
k1
√
n log n
i1
) (
k2q√
n
)i1 (
1 − k2q√
n
)k1 √n log n−i1
(104)
+
k1k2q(log n)(1−∆xz10)∑
i2=0
(
k1
√
n log n
i2
) (
k2q√
n
)i2 (
1 − k2q√
n
)k1 √n log n−i2
(105)
+
k1
√
n log n∑
i3=k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1+∆xz11)
(
k1
√
n log n
i3
) (
k2(1 − q)√
n
)i3 (
1 − k2(1 − q)√
n
)k1 √n log n−i3
(106)
+
k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1−∆xz11)∑
i4=0
(
k1
√
n log n
i4
) (
k2(1 − q)√
n
)i4 (
1 − k2(1 − q)√
n
)k1 √n log n−i4
. (107)
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Here the four terms in (104)-(107) correspond to the four possible atypical ranges for the pair ( f xz10 , f
xz
11 ). For notational
convenience we define an auxiliary function h(i) as
h(i) =
(
k1
√
n log n
i
) (
k2q√
n
)i (
1 − k2q√
n
)k1 √n log n−i
. (108)
Appendix D shows that as n grows without bound, the terms in (104)-(107) respectively satisfy
k1
√
n log n∑
i1=k1k2q(log n)(1+∆xz10)
h(i1) ≤ n−k1k2q f (∆xz10)+δ/2, (109)
k1k2q(log n)(1−∆xz10)∑
i2=0
h(i2) ≤ n−k1k2q f (∆xz10)+δ/2, (110)
k1
√
n log n∑
i3=k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1+∆xz11)
h(i3) ≤ n−k1k2(1−q) f (∆xz11)+δ/2, (111)
k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1−∆xz11)∑
i4=0
h(i4) ≤ n−k1k2(1−q) f (∆xz11)+δ/2, (112)
where the auxiliary function f (·) is as defined in Section IV. Recall that Equation (9) together with Equations (11)-(13) require
the code chunk length design parameter k1 to satisfy the following two conditions13:
k1k2q · f (∆xz10) ≥ 1/2 + δ, (113)
k1k2(1 − q) · f (∆xz11) ≥ 1/2 + δ. (114)
Therefore, we have
EC(i)

∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 ≤ 4n− 12− δ2 . (115)

In Claim 8, we show with high probability over the inner code design, for the randomly chosen inner code C(i), the probability
of receiving an atypical z(i) plus the probability of receiving a typical z(i) induced by a conditionally atypical inner-codeword
x(i) is polynomially small.
Claim 8 (Terms in (67)). With probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the inner code design, the randomly chosen inner
code C(i) satisfies
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) +
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)) ≤ 4n− 12− δ4 . (116)
Proof: By combining Claim 5 and Claim 7, with probability (over the inner code design) at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
, we have
n−
1
2− δ4 + 2n−
1
2− δ2 (117)
≥ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
EC(i)

∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (118)
13In order to show the probability (averaged over the inner code design) that a typical z(i) is received and a conditionally atypical inner-codeword x(i) is
transmitted is bounded from above by O(n−1/2−δ), we require each of the four terms in (104)-(107) to scale as O(n−1/2−δ). And this requirement, in turn,
forces us to scale ∆xz10 and ∆
xz
11 as constants (in the interval [0, 1]) that satisfy the constraints in (113) and (114). By contrast, the parameters ∆
xy
10 and ∆
xy
11, first
defined in (32), specifying the “width” of Bob’s conditionally typical set AB
X|y(i) , scale as (log n)
−1/3 since the probability of error is not necessarily required to
decay faster than O(n−1/2). The scalings of ∆xy10 and ∆xy11, which are diminishing functions of n, make the proof of reliability a lot easier since the Chernoff
bound is applicable in this case.
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≥ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ

∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 + 12EC(i)

∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )

−1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ), (119)
where Equation (118) follows from Claim 5 and Claim 7, and Equation (119) follows from the triangle inequality. Note that
the summation of the first two terms of (119) equals the probability of receiving a typical z(i) under the ensemble-averaged
active distribution, which, by Claim 6, equals
1
2
EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)∈ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 = 12 − 12EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 ≥ 12 − exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ q)
3
nδ log n
)
. (120)
For the third term of Equation (119), we have
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (121)
=
1
2
− 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)). (122)
Hence, combining Equations (119), (120) and (122), for sufficiently large n, with probability (over the inner code design) at
least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
, the chosen inner code C(i) satisfies
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) +
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)) (123)
≤ n− 12− δ4 + 2n− 12− δ2 + exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ q)
3
nδ log n
)
(124)
≤ 4n− 12− δ4 . (125)
This completes the proof of Claim 8. 
Equipped with Claims 5-8, we are able to show that for any chunk i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, with high probability over the inner code
design, the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (Z
(i))
)
and the active distribution P(i)1 (Z
(i)) are sufficiently close.
Claim 9. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, with probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the inner code design, for the randomly
chosen inner code C(i), the variational distance between the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(i)
(
P(i)1 (Z
(i))
)
and the
active distribution P(i)1 (Z
(i)) is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8n− 12− δ4 .
Proof: For any i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and sufficiently large n, with probability (over the inner code design) at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
,
1
2
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C(i)
P(C(i))
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) −
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (126)
+
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
EC(i)

∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 + 12EC(i)
 ∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i))
 (127)
+
1
2
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) +
1
2
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)) (128)
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≤ n− 12− δ4 + exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ q)
3
nδ log n
)
+ 2n−
1
2− δ2 + 4n−
1
2− δ4 (129)
≤ 8n− 12− δ4 ,
where inequalities (126)-(128) are adapted from (62)-(64), and inequality (129) follows from Claims 5-8. 
In the following, we take one more step to show that with high probability over the concatenated code design, the n-letter
ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(P1) and the “chunk-wise independent” distribution P
(1)
1 P
(2)
1 · · · P(L)1 are close.
Lemma 3 (Restated). With probability at least 1− √n exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the concatenated code design, for the randomly chosen
code C, the variational distance between the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(P1) and the “chunk-wise independent”
product distribution P(1)1 P
(2)
1 · · · P(L)1 is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ ≤ n− δ4 .
Proof: Based on Claim 9 and the union bound, it is then the case that with probability at least 1 − L · 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over
the concatenated code design, the variational distance between the ensemble-averaged active distribution and “chunk-wise
independent” product distribution is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣EC(P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))) − P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))∣∣∣ (130)
≤ 1
2
L∑
i=1
∑
z(i)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣∣EC(i) (P(i)1 (z(i))) − P(i)1 (z(i))∣∣∣∣ (131)
= 8L · n− 12− δ4 (132)
=
8
√
n
k1 log n
· n− 12− δ4 (133)
≤ n− δ4 , (134)
for sufficiently large n. Note that 1 − L · 2 exp
(
−4√n/3
)
≤ 1 − √n exp
(
−4√n/3
)
, since L =
√
n/(k1 log n). This completes the
proof of Lemma 3. 
B. Proof of Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 aims to bound the variational distance between the n-letter active distribution P1(Z(1), . . . ,Z(L)) and the “chunk-wise
independent” product distribution P(1)1 (Z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (Z(L)). Let l1 , λL be the number of systematic chunks and l2 , L(1 − λ) be
the number of parity chunks. We first note that for any z(1), . . . , z(L), the n-letter active distribution can be decomposed as
P1(z(1), . . . , z(L)) = P(z(1), . . . , z(l1)) · P(z(l1+1), . . . , z(L)|z(1), . . . , z(l1)) (135)
= P(1)1 (z
(1)) · · · P(l1)1 (z(l1)) · P(z(l1+1), . . . , z(L)|z(1), . . . , z(l1)), (136)
since the inner codes in the first l1 systematic chunks, and also the messages W (i) = M(i) that are inputs to those chunks, are all
independent. However, the analysis for the remaining l2 parity chunks is more involved since the Reed-Solomon outer code
in general introduces correlations between W (i) in the l1 systematic chunks (which are l1-wise independent) and any W (i
′) in
a parity chunk — in particular, any such W (i
′) is a linear combination of W (i) in the l1 systematic chunks. The crux of the
proof is to show that conditioned on Willie’s typical observations (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) on systematic chunks, the parity inner-message
vectors (W (l1+1), . . . ,W (L)) are almost uniformly distributed from Willie’s perspective (essentially statistically independent of
(z(1), . . . , z(l1))). The uniformity of parity inner-message vectors further implies that P(z(l1+1) · · · z(L)|z(1) · · · z(l1)) ≈∏Li=l1+1 P(i)1 (z(i))
and P(z(1) · · · z(L)) ≈∏Li=1 P(i)1 (z(i)). We make it more concrete in the following.
Willie’s observations (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) on systematic chunks is said to be typical if each of z(i) is typical, i.e.
(z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈
(
ABZ
)⊗l1
if z(i) ∈ ABZ , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l1}. (137)
To simplify our analysis, we assume there is an oracle revealing to Willie which conditional type class does each of the
transmitted inner-codeword (on systematic chunks) x(i)w fall into. The oracle revealed information on the i-th chunk is denoted by
τ(i), which exactly equals the type class T BX|z(i) ( f xz10 , f xz11 ) defined in Section VI-A. Note that this extra information only strengthens
Willie since it reduces his uncertainty about Alice’s transmissions. Due to the fact that the channel transition probabilities
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) are the same for all x(i)w ∈ τ(i), all the inner-messages w(i) with x(i)w ∈ τ(i) are equally likely from Willie’s perspective.
The collection of oracle revealed information (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)) is said to be typical if each of τ(i) is typical, i.e.,
(τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)) ∈
(
F xzB
)⊗l1
if τ(i) ∈ F xzB , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l1}, (138)
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where F xzB (defined in Section VI-A) contains all conditionally typical type class indicated by ( f xz10 , f xz11 ). Note that the distribution
of (W (l1+1), . . . ,W (L)) conditioned on (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) can be expressed as
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) (139)
=
∑
w(1)...w(l1)
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣w(1) . . .w(l1), z(1) . . . z(l1)) · P (w(1) . . .w(l1)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) (140)
=
∑
w(1)...w(l1)
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣w(1) . . .w(l1)) · P (w(1) . . .w(l1)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) (141)
=
∑
(w(1)...w(l1))∈S(w(l1+1)...w(L))
P
(
w(1) . . .w(l1)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) (142)
=
∑
(w(1)...w(l1))∈S(w(l1+1)...w(L)) 1
{
x(1)w ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w ∈ τ(l1)
}
∏l1
i=1
∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)∣∣∣∣ , (143)
where S(w(l1+1) . . .w(L)) is the set of systematic inner-message vectors (w(1) . . .w(l1)) that are encoded to (w(1) . . .w(l1),w(l1+1) . . .w(L))
by the systematic outer code. Equation (142) holds since P(w(l1+1) . . .w(L)|w(1) . . .w(l1)) equals one if (w(1) . . .w(l1)) ∈ S(w(l1+1) . . .w(L)),
and equals zero otherwise. Equation (143) is obtained by noting that
P(w(1) · · ·w(l1)|z(1) . . . z(l1)) = 1∏l1
i=1 |w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)|
(144)
if the corresponding inner-codewords (on systematic chunks) satisfy x(1)w ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w ∈ τ(l1), and equals zero otherwise.
Let Υi , PX(i)(X
(i) ∈ τ(i)) be the probability that a randomly generated inner-codeword falls into the oracle revealed type
class τ(i), and note that Υi depends on the type τ(i) only. Without loss of generality, we assume Υ1 ≥ Υ2 ≥ · · · ≥ Υl1 . We then
concentrate the numerator of (143) in Claim 10.
Claim 10. For any typical oracle revealed type classes (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)) ∈
(
F xzB
)⊗l1
and parity inner-message vector (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)),
with probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
over the code design ,
∑
(w(1)...w(l1))∈S(w(l1+1)...w(L))
1
{
x(1)w ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w ∈ τ(l1)
}
∈ (1 ± n−1)
ν · l1∏
i=1
Υi
 . (145)
Proof: Let ν , n(l1−l2)rˆ (where nrˆ is the size of inner code). We show in Appendix E that |S(w(l1+1) . . .w(L))| = ν for every parity
inner-message vector (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)). For the j-th element (w(1)j . . .w
(l1)
j ) in S(w(l1+1) . . .w(L)), we define the corresponding
random variable as
U j , 1
{
x(1)w j ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w j ∈ τ(l1)
}
,∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ν}. (146)
Let
U ,
ν∑
j=1
U j =
∑
(w(1)...w(l1))∈S(w(l1+1)...w(L))
1
{
x(1)w ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w ∈ τ(l1)
}
. (147)
It is worth noting that for j1 , j2, the random variables U j1 and U j2 are not necessarily independent since their corresponding
systematic inner-message vectors may share some common inner-messages (i.e., w(i)j1 = w
(i)
j2
for some i). Specifically, the
probability that U j1 equals one will be larger if U j2 = 1 and w
(i)
j1
= w(i)j2 for some i, since x
(i)
j1
(the inner-codeword for w(i)j1 ) is
already known to belong to τ(i). In the following, we use the second-moment method to concentrate U. The first moment is
given as
E(U) =
ν∑
j=1
E(U j) = ν · P
(
X(1) ∈ τ(1), . . . ,X(l1) ∈ τ(l1)
)
= ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi. (148)
Calculating the second moment is more involved because of the dependencies between random variables. We have
E(U2) = E
 ν∑
j=1
U2j +
∑
j1, j2
U j1U j2
 = ν∑
i= j
E
(
U2j
)
+
∑
j1, j2
E
(
U j1U j2
)
(149)
=
ν∑
j=1
E
(
U j
)
+
∑
j1, j2
P
(
U j1 = 1,U j2 = 1
)
(150)
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=
ν∑
j=1
E
(
U j
)
+
∑
j1, j2
 l1∏
i=1
Υi
 · P (U j2 = 1|U j1 = 1) . (151)
Definition 11. For j1 , j2, the distance d(U j1 ,U j2) between two random variables U j1 and U j2 (as introduced in (146)) is
defined as
d(U j1 ,U j2 ) ,
∣∣∣∣i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l1} : w(i)j1 , w(i)j2 ∣∣∣∣ . (152)
Note that the conditional probability P(U j2 = 1|U j1 = 1) depends on the distance between U j1 and U j2 . Specifically, if
d(U j1 ,U j2 ) = t and the locations that they differ in are denoted by {i1, . . . , it}, then we have
P
(
U j2 = 1|U j1 = 1
)
= P
(
X(i1) ∈ τ(i1), . . . ,X(it) ∈ τ(it)
)
=
it∏
i=i1
Υi ≤
t∏
i=1
Υi, (153)
where the last step follows from the assumption Υ1 ≥ Υ2 ≥ · · · ≥ Υl1 . In Appendix F, we show that the number of j1 , j2 such
that d(U j1 ,U j2 ) = t equals
ν ·
(
l1
t
)
(nrˆ − 1)
t−l2−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t − 1
i
) (
nrˆ
)t−i−l2−1
if t ≥ l2 + 1, (154)
and equals 0 otherwise. Roughly speaking, the proof of (154) is inspired by the weight distribution of Maximum Distance
Separable (MDS) code. Hence the term in (151) can be expressed as
ν∑
j=1
E
(
U j
)
+
l1∑
t=l2+1
∑
j1, j2:d(U j1 ,U j2 )=t
 l1∏
i=1
Υi
 · P (U j2 = 1|U j1 = 1) (155)
≤
ν∑
j=1
E
(
U j
)
+
l1∑
t=l2+1
 l1∏
i=1
Υi

 t∏
i=1
Υi
 · ν · (l1t
)
(nrˆ − 1)
t−l2−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t − 1
i
) (
nrˆ
)t−i−l2−1
. (156)
Let the auxiliary function f˜ (t) =
(∏l1
i=1 Υi
) (∏t
i=1 Υi
)
· ν ·
(
l1
t
)
(nrˆ − 1)∑t−l2−1i=0 (−1)i(t−1i ) (nrˆ)t−i−l2−1, we calculate the ratio between
two successive terms as follows:
f˜ (t)
f˜ (t − 1) =
(∏l1
i=1 Υi
) (∏t
i=1 Υi
)
·
[
ν ·
(
l1
t
)
(nrˆ − 1)
((
nrˆ
)t−l2−1 − (t − 1) (nrˆ)t−l2−2 + · · · )](∏l1
i=1 Υi
) (∏t−1
i=1 Υi
)
·
[
ν ·
(
l1
t−1
)
(nrˆ − 1)
((
nrˆ
)t−l2−2 − (t − 2) (nrˆ)t−l2−3 + · · · )] (157)
=
(∏l1
i=1 Υi
) (∏t
i=1 Υi
)
·
[
ν ·
(
l1
t
)
(nrˆ − 1)
(
nrˆ(t−l2−1) − O
(
nrˆ(t−l2−2)+1/2
))](∏l1
i=1 Υi
) (∏t−1
i=1 Υi
)
·
[
ν ·
(
l1
t−1
)
(nrˆ − 1) (nrˆ(t−l2−2) − O (nrˆ(t−l2−3)+1/2))] (158)
n→∞
= Υt · nrˆ · l1 − t + 1t (159)
≥ n
rˆΥl1
l1
, (160)
where inequality (160) holds for all l2 + 1 ≤ t ≤ l1. It turns out that f˜ (t) is an increasing function since nrˆΥl1 ≥ n 32 +δ and
l1 ≤ √n. Substituting (160) into (156), we have
E(U2) =
ν∑
j=1
E
(
U j
)
+
l1∑
t=l2+1
f˜ (t) (161)
≤ ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi + f˜ (l1)
1 + l1Υl1 · (nrˆ) +
(
l1
Υl1 ·
(
nrˆ
) )2 + · · ·  (162)
≤ ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi +
 l1∏
i=1
Υi

2 (
ν
(
nrˆ(l1−l2) − l1nrˆ(l1−l2−1) + · · ·
)) 1 + ( l2Υl1 · nrˆ
)
+
(
l1
Υl1 · nrˆ
)2
+ · · ·
 (163)
= ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi +
 l1∏
i=1
Υi

2 (
ν
(
nrˆ(l1−l2) − O
(
nrˆ(l1−l2−1)
)))
(164)
≤ ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi +
ν · l1∏
i=1
Υi

2
. (165)
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For any small ε > 0, we define an auxiliary random variable V , U − (1 − ε)E(U), with
E(V) = εν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi, (166)
E(V2) = E(U2) + (ε2 − 1) (E(U))2 ≤ ν ·
l1∏
i=1
Υi +
εν · l1∏
i=1
Υi

2
. (167)
Furthermore, let
V ′ =
V, if V > 0,0, otherwise, (168)
and one can show that E(V ′) ≥ E(V) and E(V ′2) ≤ E(V2). By setting ε = n−1, as n grows without bound, we have
P
(
U > (1 − n−1)E(U)
)
= P(V > 0) = P(V ′ > 0) (169)
≥ (E(V
′))2
E(V ′2)
(170)
≥ (E(V))
2
E(V2)
(171)
≥
(
n−1ν ·∏l1i=1 Υi)2
ν ·∏l1i=1 Υi + (n−1ν ·∏l1i=1 Υi)2 (172)
≥ 1 − n−(( 32 +δ)l1−l2 rˆ−2) (173)
≥ 1 − exp
(
−3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
. (174)
where (170) follows from the second moment method, and (173) holds since nrˆΥi ≥ n 32 +δ for any typical τ(i) (as indicated
by (9) and (78)).
Similarly, by setting V = (1 + n−1)E(U) − U, one can also prove that as n grows without bound,
P
(
U < (1 + n−1)E(U)
)
≥ 1 − exp
(
−3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
, (175)
which completes the proof. 
Claim 12. For any (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈
(
ABZ
)⊗l1
and typical oracle revealed type classes (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)) ∈
(
F xzB
)⊗l1
, with probability
at least 1 − 4 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
, we have
P
(
w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)
∣∣∣z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ (1 ± 3n− δ4 )
nl2 rˆ
, ∀(w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)). (176)
Proof: As noted in (143),
P
(
w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)
∣∣∣z(1), . . . , z(l1)) = ∑(w(1)...w(l1))∈S(w(l1+1)...w(L)) 1
{
x(1)w ∈ τ(1), . . . , x(l1)w ∈ τ(l1)
}
∏l1
i=1
∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)∣∣∣∣ (177)
Recall that in (85), we have shown that for the i-th systematic chunk, given a typical received vector z(i) and a conditionally
typical type class τ(i), the number of inner-codewords falling into τ(i) is tightly concentrated around its expectation, i.e.,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)∣∣∣ − Υinrˆ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2n− 12− δ4 Υinrˆ) ≥ 1 − 2 exp (−43 √n
)
, (178)
where Υinrˆ is the expected number of inner-codewords falling into τ(i). By taking a union bound over all l1 (l1 <
√
n) systematic
chunk, we prove that the product of
∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)∣∣∣ can also be concentrated, i.e.,
P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l1∏
i=1
∣∣∣∣w(i) : x(i)w ∈ τ(i)∣∣∣∣ − nl1 rˆ l1∏
i=1
Υi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2n− δ4 nl1 rˆ
l1∏
i=1
Υi
 ≥ 1 − 2√n exp (−43 √n
)
. (179)
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Combining (179) and Claim 10, we obtain that with probability at least14 1 − 4 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
,
P
(
w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)
∣∣∣z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ≤ (1 + n−1)ν∏l1i=1 Υi(
1 − 2n− δ4
)
nl1 rˆ
∏l1
i=1 Υi
(180)
=
1
nl2 rˆ
(1 + n−1)
(
1 + 2n−
δ
4 +
(
2n−
δ
4
)2
+ · · ·
)
(181)
n→∞≤ (1 + 3n
− δ4 )
nl2 rˆ
, (182)
P
(
w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)
∣∣∣z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ≥ (1 − n−1)ν∏l1i=1 Υi(
1 + 2n− δ4
)
nl1 rˆ
∏l1
i=1 Υi
n→∞≥ (1 + 3n
− δ4 )
nl2 rˆ
, (183)
where (181) follows since ν = nrˆ(l1−l2). Since the number of (w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)) is only exp
(
o(
√
n)
)
, we are able to take a union
bound over all (w(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)). 
With Claim 12, we are able to prove Lemma 4 — the variational distance between the active distribution P1(Z(1), . . . ,Z(L))
and the “chunk-wise independent” distribution P(1)1 (Z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (Z(L)) goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
Lemma 4 (Restated). With probability at least 1− exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the concatenated code design and the channel noise
to Willie, for the randomly chosen code C, the variational distance between the n-letter active distribution P1(Z(1), . . . ,Z(L))
and the “chunk-wise independent” product distribution P(1)1 (Z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (Z(L)) is bounded from above as
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ ≤ 2n− δ4 .
Proof: We first partition (z(1) . . . z(l1)) into (z(1) . . . z(l1)) ∈
(
ABZ
)⊗l1
and (z(1) . . . z(l1)) <
(
ABZ
)⊗l1
as follows.∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ = ∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣
(184)
+
∑
(z(1)...z(l1))<(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ .
(185)
The right-hand side (RHS) of (184) can further be decomposed into two parts — (i) all z(i) (i ∈ {1, . . . , l1}) are contributed by
typical inner-codewords, and (ii) there exists at least one z(i) (i ∈ {1, . . . , l1}) is contributed by atypical inner-codewords.∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ (186)
=
∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
P(1)1 (z
(1)) · · · P(l1)1 (z(l1))
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣∣P(l1+1)1 (z(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P (z(l1+1) · · · z(L)∣∣∣z(1) · · · z(l1))∣∣∣∣ (187)
≤
∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣∣P(l1+1)1 (z(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P (z(l1+1) . . . z(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))∣∣∣∣ (188)
+
∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))<(F xzB )
⊗l1
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣∣P(l1+1)1 (z(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P (z(l1+1) . . . z(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))∣∣∣∣ , (189)
where (188) and (189) follow from the total probability theorem. To prove Lemma 4, we need to show that with high probability
over the code design, terms (185), (188), and (189) all go to zero as n grows without bound.
14Note that 2
√
n exp
(
− 43
√
n
)
is decaying faster than 2 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
because of value of k1.
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1) Bounding the term in (188): We first consider the typical event — the term in (188). Note that
P(l1+1)1 (z
(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) =
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|w(i))
 , (190)
P
(
z(l1+1) . . . z(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) (191)
=
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) P (z(l1+1) · · · z(L)∣∣∣w(l1+1) . . .w(L), z(1) . . . z(l1)) (192)
=
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) P (z(l1+1) · · · z(L)∣∣∣w(l1+1) . . .w(L)) (193)
=
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) L∏
i=l1+1
P
(
z(i)
∣∣∣x(i)w ) , (194)
where (193) holds since the received vectors of the systematic chunks (z(1) . . . z(l1)), the parity inner-message vector (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)),
and the received vectors of the parity chunks (z(l1+1) · · · z(L)), form a Markov chain. Equation (194) follows from the memoryless
property of the channel. By the triangle inequality, the term in (188) can further be bounded from above as∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )

∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 L∏
i=l1+1
1
nrˆ
 − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ·
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (195)
=
∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
z(1)∈T (1)Z ,...,z(l1)∈T
(l1)
Z
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )

∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 L∏
i=l1+1
1
nrˆ
 − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (196)
=
∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P
(
T (i)Z
∣∣∣τ(i)) ∑
z(1)∈T (1)Z ,...,z(l1)∈T
(l1)
Z
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1nl2 rˆ − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 . (197)
In (196), for each of the systematic chunk, we decompose the typical set ABZ into typical type classes T (i)Z ∈ F zB that comprise
it. Equation (197) is obtained by noting that the values of
∏l1
i=1
1
nrˆ P(z
(i)|x(i)w ) are the same for all (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z )
and (x(1)w , . . . , x
(l1)
w ) ∈ (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), hence we use
∏l1
i=1
1
nrˆ P(T (i)Z |τ(i)) to denote this value. Recall that Claim 12 shows that for a
typical (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) and a conditionally typical (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), with probability at least 1 − 4 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
,
P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) ∈ (1 ± 3n− δ4 )
nl2 rˆ
, ∀
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
)
. (198)
We wish to take a union bound to show that with high probability, the concentration inequality (198) holds for all typical
(z(1), . . . , z(l1)) and conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), however, it is not valid since the number of (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) is
exponential in n, and the probability that (198) holds is only sub-exponentially close to one. Instead, we circumvent this issue
by a less ambitious approach. For each typical type class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)),
we define
Ω
(
T (1)Z . . .T (l1)Z
)
,
{
(z(1), . . . , z(l1)) :
(
z(1) ∈ T (1)Z , . . . , z(l1) ∈ T (l1)Z
)}
, (199)
ΩX
(
T (1)Z . . .T (l1)Z , τ(1) . . . τ(l1)
)
,
(z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ Ω : P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1)) ∈ (1 ± 3n−
δ
4 )
nl2 rˆ
, ∀
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
) , (200)
Ω×
(
T (1)Z . . .T (l1)Z , τ(1) . . . τ(l1)
)
, Ω
(
T (1)Z . . .T (l1)Z
)
\ΩX
(
T (1)Z . . .T (l1)Z , τ(1) . . . τ(l1)
)
. (201)
For notational convenience we ignore the arguments inside Ω, ΩX, and Ω× in the following. Note that ΩX contains all
(z(1), z(2), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ Ω that satisfies (198). In Claim 13 we use Markov’s inequality to show that with probability at least
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1− exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
, for all typical type class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), only a small
fraction of (z(1), z(2), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ Ω belongs to Ω×.
Claim 13. With probability at least 1 − exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the code design, for all typical type class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and
conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), we have
|Ω×| ≤ |Ω| · 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
. (202)
Proof: For a fixed typical type class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and a conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), by the fact that
E (|Ω×|) ≤ |Ω| · 4 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
and the Markov’s inequality, we have
P
(
|Ω×| ≥ |Ω| · 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
))
≤
|Ω| · 4 exp
(
− 3(ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
|Ω| · 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
) = exp (− (ln 2)√n
k1
)
. (203)
We then take a union bound over all typical (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and all conditionally typical (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)). The union bound is
valid since ∣∣∣∣(T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) : T (1)Z ∈ F zB, . . . ,T (l1)Z ∈ F zB∣∣∣∣ = (2(ρ ∗ q)∆z1B)l1 = 2( 14 + δ2 ) √nk1 ·(1+O( log log nlog n )), (204)∣∣∣∣∣(τ(1) . . . τ(l1)) : (τ(1) . . . τ(l1)) ∈ (F xzB )⊗l1 ∣∣∣∣∣ = ((2ρq∆xz10B) · (2ρ(1 − q)∆xz11B))l1 = 2O( √n(log log n)log n ). (205)
Therefore, with probability at least 1− exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the code design, |Ω×| ≤ |Ω| · 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
holds for all typical
type class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)). 
Roughly speaking, with the help of Claim 13, we are able to show that the n-letter active distribution P1(Z(1), . . . ,Z(l1)) and the
“chunk-wise independent” distribution P(1)1 (Z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (Z(L)) are sufficiently close under the “good” event (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ ΩX,
since (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ ΩX guarantees∣∣∣∣∣ 1nl2 rˆ − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3n− δ4nl2 rˆ , ∀ (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)) , (206)
while the “bad” event (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ Ω× occurs with decaying probability. Returning back to (197), for each each typical type
class (T (1)Z , . . . ,T (l1)Z ) and conditionally typical type class (τ(1), . . . , τ(l1)), we further decompose (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) into (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈
ΩX and (z(1), . . . , z(l1)) ∈ Ω×. We first bound the term corresponding to ΩX as follows.∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P
(
T (i)Z
∣∣∣τ(i)) ∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈ΩX
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1nl2 rˆ − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (207)
≤
∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P
(
T (i)Z
∣∣∣τ(i)) ∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈ΩX
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
· 3n− δ4
∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
1
nl2 rˆ
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (208)
≤ 3n− δ4
∑
z(1)
· · ·
∑
z(L)
∑
w(1)
· · ·
∑
w(L)
 L∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (209)
= 3n−
δ
4 , (210)
where the inequality (209) is obtained by changing order of summations and dropping the requirements that z(i) is typical and
x(i)w is conditionally typical. We then bound the term corresponding to Ω×.∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P
(
T (i)Z
∣∣∣τ(i)) ∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈Ω×
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
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∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1nl2 rˆ − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 , (211)
w.h.p.≤ 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
·
∑
T (1)Z ∈F zB,...,T
(l1)
Z ∈F zB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))∈(F xzB )
⊗l1
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P
(
T (i)Z
∣∣∣τ(i)) ∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈Ω
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1nl2 rˆ − P (w(l1+1) . . .w(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (212)
≤ 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
·
∑
z(1)
· · ·
∑
z(l1)
∑
w(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )

∑
w(l1+1)...w(L)
(
1
nl2 rˆ
+ P
(
w(l1+1) . . .w(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))) ∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
 L∏
i=l1+1
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
 (213)
≤ 8 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
. (214)
Note that inequality (212) holds with probability at least 1− exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
by Claim 13, and inequality (213) follows from
the triangle inequality. By combining (197), (210) and (214), we prove that with probability at least 1 − exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
,
the term in (188) (corresponding to the typical event) is bounded from above by 3n−
δ
4 + 8 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
.
2) Bounding the terms in (185) and (189): We now consider the atypical events expressed in (185) and (189). Recall that
in (185), (z(1) . . . z(l1)) <
(
ABZ
)⊗l1
implies there exists at least one i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l1} such that z(i) < ABZ , hence∑
(z(1)...z(l1))<(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ (215)
≤
l1∑
i=1
∑
z(i)<ABZ
∑
(z(1)...z(i−1),z(i+1)...z(l1))
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
(
P(1)1 (z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) + P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))
)
(216)
≤ 2l1
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P(i)1 (z
(i)). (217)
Similarly, the term (189) implies there exists at least one i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l1} such that z(i) ∈ ABZ and τ(i) < F xzB , hence∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
(τ(1)...τ(l1))<(F xzB )
⊗l1
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
∣∣∣∣P(l1+1)1 (z(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P (z(l1+1) . . . z(L)∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))∣∣∣∣ (218)
≤
l1∑
i=1
∑
(z(1)...z(l1))∈(ABZ)
⊗l1
∑
τ(i)<F xzB
∑
(τ(1)...τ(i−1),τ(i+1)...τ(l1))
∑
w(1):x(1)w ∈τ(1)
· · ·
∑
w(l1):x(l1)w ∈τ(l1)
 l1∏
i=1
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w )
∑
z(l1+1)...z(L)
(
P(l1+1)1 (z
(l1+1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) + P
(
z(l1+1) . . . z(L)
∣∣∣z(1) . . . z(l1))) (219)
≤ 2l1
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
τ(i)<F xzB
∑
w(i):x(i)w ∈τ(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) (220)
= 2l1
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ). (221)
By Claim 8, we are able to show that with probability at least 1 − exp
(
−4√n/3
)
over the code design, the terms in (185)
and (189) can be bounded from above as
2l1
∑
z(i)<ABZ
P1(z(i)) + 2l1
∑
z(i)∈ABZ
∑
w(i):x(i)w <ABX|z(i)
1
nrˆ
P(z(i)|x(i)w ) ≤ 2l1 ·
(
8n−
1
2− δ4
)
≤ 16n
− δ4
k1 log n
. (222)
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Combining the proofs for (185), (188), and (189), we finally obtain that
1
2
∑
z(1)∈{0,1}B...z(L)∈{0,1}B
∣∣∣P(1)1 (z(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L)) − P1(z(1), . . . , z(L))∣∣∣ ≤ 32n− δ4 + 4 exp
(
− (ln 2)
√
n
2k1
)
+
8n−
δ
4
k1 log n
n→∞≤ 2n− δ4 , (223)
with probability at least 1 − exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the code design. This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
C. Concluding remarks for the proof of covertness
To bound the variational distance between the innocent distribution P0 and the active distribution P1, we repeatedly use the
triangle inequality to obtain
V (P0, P1) ≤ V (P0,EC(P1)) + V (EC(P1), P1) (224)
≤ V (P0,EC(P1)) + V
(
EC(P1), P
(1)
1 (z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))
)
+ V
(
P1, P
(1)
1 (z
(1)) · · · P(L)1 (z(L))
)
. (225)
By Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we obtain that with probability at least 1 − exp
(
− ( 34− δ2 )(ln 2)
√
n
k1
)
over the concatenated code design and
the channel noise to Willie, for the randomly chosen code C,
V(P0, P1) ≤ d + n−δ/4 + n−δ/4 + 2n−δ/4 (226)
≤ d + 4n−δ/4, (227)
This completes the proof of covertness of our proposed codes, as in Property 3) in Theorem 1.
VIII. Proof of Reliability
In this section we show that with high probability over the concatenated code design, the probability of error of a randomly
chosen code C is at most exp
(
−2√n/(k1(log n)2)
)
. Figure 5 is a road-map summarizing our proof of reliability. Upon receiving
y, Bob first partitions y into L chunks (y(1), y(2), . . . , y(L)). For each chunk i, Bob decodes the inner-message Wˆ (i) = Γ(i)in (y
(i)) by
using the inner decoder Γ(i)in (·), and then reconstructs Mˆ from Reed-Solomon code. We now elaborate on the decoding rule of
Bob’s inner decoder Γ(i)in (·), for reconstructing the inner-message Wˆ (i) as follows.
Decoding Rule Wˆ (i)(y(i)) for reconstructing the inner-message on chunk i:
1) If y(i) ∈ AB,(0)Y \ ABY , then Bob decodes Wˆ (i) = 0.
2) If y(i) ∈ ABY , then
a) If there is exactly one inner-message w(i) such that x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i) , then Bob decodes Wˆ (i) = w(i).
b) If there exists two inner-messages w(i) and w˜(i) such that w(i) , w˜(i), x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i) and x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i) , then Bob
declares an error.
c) If there does not exist an inner-message w(i) such that x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i) , then Bob decodes Wˆ (i) = 0.
3) If y(i) is neither in AB,(0)Y nor in ABY , then Bob declares an error.
Figure 6 is a flow-chart describing the decoding procedure and the potential error events of Bob’s decoder Γ(·). In the
following, we first consider the probability of decoding error of one single chunk, P(Wˆ (i) , W (i)), under the decoder Γ(i)in (·) in
Claims 14-18 and Lemma 19, and then analyze the probability of error Perr of the outer RS code in Lemma 20.
A. Probability of decoding error of one single chunk
When Alice’s transmission status T = 1, without loss of generality, we assume the inner-message w(i) is transmitted. Since
the inner-messages (for the i-th chunk) are equiprobable and each inner-codeword is generated i.i.d., the analysis of error
probability is the same no matter which inner-message is transmitted. Therefore, the probability of error Pe,(1) when Alice is
transmitting is defined as
Pe,(1) = P
(
Wˆ (i) , W (i)
∣∣∣T = 1) = P (Wˆ (i) , w(i)∣∣∣W (i) = w(i),T = 1) . (228)
When Alice’s transmission status T = 0, the probability of error Pe,(2) is defined as
Pe,(2) = P
(
Wˆ (i) , 0
∣∣∣T = 0) . (229)
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inner code design, the probability of
receiving an atypical 𝒚(𝑖) is at most 𝑛−1 .
Chernoff bound, Markov’s inequality 
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RS code with negligible redundancy
Fig. 5: A road-map of our proof that our codes are highly reliable with high probability.
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Fig. 6: A flow-chart describing the decoding procedure and the potential error events.
The probability of decoding error of one single chunk is given as
P(Wˆ (i) , W (i)) = Pe,(1) + Pe,(2). (230)
In the following, we show that both the probability of error when T = 0 and the probability of error when T = 1 go to zero
asymptotically. Figure 7 depicts the region of various error events in greater detail.
Upper bound on Pe,(1): From Bob’s decoding rule, the probability of error when transmitting (T = 1) can be expanded as
follows.
P
(
Wˆ (i) , w(i)
∣∣∣W (i) = w(i),T = 1) (231)
≤
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) < ABY
}
(232)
+
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w < ABX|y(i)
}
(233)
+
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
∃w˜(i) , w(i) s.t. y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
. (234)
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Fig. 7: (a) The inner decoder outputs Wˆ (i) = 0 if y(i) falls into the gray region. Therefore, the blank region represents the possible error events
when T = 0, i.e., (i) y(i) <
(
AB,(0)Y ∪ABY
)
or (ii) y(i) ∈ ABY , but there exists an inner-codeword falling into the conditionally typical set.
(b) The inner decoder outputs the transmitted inner-codeword if y(i) falls into the gray region, i.e., (i) y(i) ∈ ABY , (ii) the transmitted
inner-codeword is conditionally typical with y(i), and (iii) there does not exist another inner-codeword that is conditionally typical with y(i).
Therefore, the blank region represents the error events when T = 1 and the “red” inner-codeword is transmitted.
The term in (232) corresponds to the probability of receiving an atypical y(i). The term in (233) corresponds to the probability
that Bob receives a typical y(i), but the true inner-codeword x(i)w does not belong to the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) . The term
in (234) corresponds to the probability that Bob receives a typical y(i), but there exists another inner-codeword x(i)w˜ (w˜ , w)
falling into the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) .
In Claims 14-15, we present that the probabilities of the three error components, presented in (232), (233) and (234),
respectively go to zero as n goes to infinity. In Claim 14, we set ∆y1 = n
−1/4+δ/2 (recall that ∆y1 is the parameter, defined in
Section VI, specifying the “width” of the typical set A1B(Y)).
Claim 14 (Term in (232)). With probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−
(
k1(ρ∗p)
3 n
δ + (ln 2)
)
(log n)
)
over the inner code design, for the
randomly chosen inner code C(i), the probability that Bob receives an atypical y(i) is bounded from above as∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) < ABY
}
≤ n−1.
Proof: The probability (averaged over the inner code design) that Bob receives an atypical y(i) equals
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) < ABY
} = ∑
x(i)w ∈{0,1}B
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
PX(x(i)w )P(y
(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) < ABY
}
(235)
= PX(i)w Y
(i)
(
Y(i) < ABY
)
(236)
≤ 2 exp
(
−k1(ρ ∗ p)
3
nδ(log n)
)
. (237)
Equation (237) follows from the Chernoff bound, since the narrow typical set ABY is centered at ρ ∗ p and with width
∆
y
1 = n
−1/4+δ/2. By the Markov’s inequality, we have
PC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) < ABY
}
≥ n−1
 ≤ 2 exp
(
−
(
k1(ρ ∗ p)
3
nδ + (ln 2)
)
(log n)
)
. (238)

Claim 15 (Term in (233)). With probability at least 1 − 4(log n) · exp
(
− 13k1k2p(log n)1/3
)
over the inner code design, for the
randomly chosen inner code C(i), the probability that Bob receives a typical y(i) and a conditionally atypical inner-codeword
x(i)w is transmitted is bounded from above as∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w < ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1/(log n).
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Proof: Note that
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w < ABX|y(i)
} (239)
=
∑
x(i)w ∈{0,1}B
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
PX(x(i)w )P(y
(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w < ABX|y(i)
}
(240)
= PX(i)w ,Y
(i)
(
Y(i) ∈ ABY ,X(i)w < ABX|Y(i)
)
(241)
≤ PX(i)w ,Y(i)
(
X(i)w < ABX|Y(i)
)
. (242)
We now bound the probability that the true inner-codeword X(i)w does not belong to the conditionally typical set ABX|Y(i) .
PX(i)w ,Y
(i)
(
X(i)w < ABX|Y(i)
)
(243)
= PX(i)w ,Y
(i)
(
f xy10 (X
(i)
w ,Y
(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xy10)ρp, (1 + ∆xy10)ρp
]⋃
f xy11 (X
(i)
w ,Y
(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xy11)ρ(1 − p), (1 + ∆xy11)ρ(1 − p)
])
(244)
≤ PX(i)w ,Y(i)
(
f xy10 (X
(i)
w ,Y
(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xy10)ρp, (1 + ∆xy10)ρp
])
+ PX(i)w ,Y
(i)
(
f xy11 (X
(i)
w ,Y
(i)) <
[
(1 − ∆xy11)ρ(1 − p), (1 + ∆xy11)ρ(1 − p)
])
(245)
≤ 2 exp
(
−1
3
k1k2p(log n)
1
3
)
+ 2 exp
(
−1
3
k1k2(1 − p)(log n) 13
)
(246)
≤ 4 exp
(
−1
3
k1k2p(log n)
1
3
)
, (247)
where inequality (246) is due to the Chernoff bound and the fact that ∆xy10 = ∆
xy
11 = (log n)
−1/3. By applying Markov’s inequality,
we obtain that with probability at least 1 − 4(log n) · exp
(
− 13k1k2p(log n)1/3
)
over the inner code design, the randomly chosen
inner code C(i) satisfies ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w < ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1/(log n).

Claim 16 (Term in (234)). With probability at least 1− 2−O((log n)3/4) over the inner code design, for the randomly chosen inner
code C(i), the probability that Bob receives a typical y(i) and there exists another inner-codeword x(i)w˜ (w˜
(i) , w(i)) falling into
the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) is bounded from above as∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
∃w˜(i) , w(i) s.t. y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1
log n
. (248)
Proof: We first note that
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
∃w˜(i) , w(i) s.t. y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (249)
≤
∑
w˜(i),w(i)
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} , (250)
and for any w˜(i) , w(i),
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (251)
=
∑
x(i)w˜ ∈{0,1}B
∑
y(i)∈ABY
PX(x(i)w˜ )P(y
(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
(252)
=
∑
y(i)∈ABY
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · PX(i)w˜
(
X(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
)
. (253)
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For any typical y(i), the probability that a single inner-codeword falls into the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) is bounded from
above as
PX(i)w˜
(
X(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
)
=
∑
( f xy10 , f
xy
11 )∈F xyB
PX(i)w˜
(
X(i)w˜ ∈ T BX|y(i) ( f xy10 , f xy11 )
)
(254)
=
∑
( f xy10 , f
xy
11 )∈F xyB
(B ( f xy01 + f xy11 )
B f xy11
)
ρB f
xy
11 (1 − ρ)B f xy01
(B ( f xy00 + f xy10 )
B f xy10
)
ρB f
xy
10 (1 − ρ)B f xy00 (255)
≤
∑
( f xy10 , f
xy
11 )∈F xyB
2−k1
√
n(log n)
[
I(x(i)w˜ ;y
(i))+D(x(i)w˜ ‖ρ)
]
(256)
≤ 2ρp B
(log n)1/3
· 2ρ(1 − p) B
(log n)1/3
· 2−k1
√
n(log n)
[
I(x(i)w˜ ;y
(i))+D(x(i)w˜ ‖ρ)
]
(257)
= 4k21k
2
2p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · n−2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
)
+O((log n)−1/3). (258)
Equation (254) decomposes the conditionally typical set ABX|y(i) into the typical conditional type classes T BX|y(i)( f xy10 , f xy11 ) that
comprise it. To obtain Equation (255), we use standard counting arguments to calculate the probability that X(i)w˜ falls into
the type class T BX|y(i)( f xy10 , f xy11 ) given a typical y(i). Equation (256) follows from the Stirling’s approximation, as well as
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) ,
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}×{0,1} f
xy
ab log
f xyab
f xa · f yb
and D(x(i)w˜ ‖ ρ) , f x0 log
f x0
1−ρ + f
x
1 log
f x1
ρ
. Equation (257) follows since the number of
typical conditional type classes is bounded from above by15
2ρp
B
(log n)1/3
· 2ρ(1 − p) B
(log n)1/3
= 2p
k2√
n
k1
√
n log n
(log n)1/3
· 2(1 − p) k2√
n
k1
√
n log n
(log n)1/3
= 4k21k
2
2p(1 − p)(log n)4/3. (259)
In Equation (258), we use the fact that
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) + D(x(i)w˜ ‖ ρ) = ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − p
p
)
+ O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
(260)
= 2d
√
q(1 − q)
n
1 − 2p
1 − 2q log
(
1 − p
p
)
+ O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
, (261)
where Equation (260) is formally proved in Appendix G, and Equation (261) follows since we set ρ = k2/
√
n =
2d
√
q(1−q)
(1−2q)√n .
Returning now to Equations (251)-(253), we have
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w˜ ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} ≤ 4k21k22p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · n−2k1d√q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log ( 1−pp )+O((log n)−1/3). (262)
Since the size of inner codebook is nrˆ (as defined in Section V), where
rˆ = ru(1 − (log n)−1/4)k1/λ = 2k1d
√
q(1 − q)1 − 2p
1 − 2q log
(
1 − p
p
)
1 − (log n)−1/4
1 − (28/ log n) , (263)
the probability (averaged over the inner code design) that there exists another inner-codeword x(i)w˜ falling into the conditionally
typical set is bounded from above as
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
∃w˜(i) , w(i) s.t. y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (264)
≤ nrˆ · EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w˜ ) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (265)
≤ nrˆ · 4k21k22p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · n−2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
)
+O((log n)−1/3) (266)
= 4k21k
2
2p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · nrˆ−2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
)
+O((log n)−1/3) (267)
= 4k21k
2
2p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · 2−
(
2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
))
(log n)3/4+O((log n)2/3) (268)
= 2log(4k
2
1k
2
2 p(1−p))+log((log n)4/3) · 2−
(
2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
))
(log n)3/4+O((log n)2/3) (269)
15Recall that we set ∆xy10 = ∆
xy
11 = (log n)
−1/3, which specify the “width” of the conditionally typical set AB
X|y(i) .
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= 2−O((log n)
3/4). (270)
Equation (268) holds since
nrˆ−2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
)
+O((log n)−1/3)
= n
(
2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
))
·
(
1−(log n)−1/4
1−(28/ log n) −1
)
+O((log n)−1/3)
= n
−
(
2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
))
·
(
(log n)−1/4−O
(
28
log n
))
+O((log n)−1/3)
= 2
−
(
2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
))
(log n)3/4+O((log n)2/3)
.
By applying Markov’s inequality, we obtain that with probability at least 1− 2−O((log n)3/4) over the inner code design, the chosen
inner code C(i) satisfies ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i)w ) · 1
{
∃w˜(i) , w(i) s.t. y(i) ∈ ABY , x(i)w˜ ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1
log n
(271)
This completes the proof of Claim 16. 
Upper bound on Pe,(2): When Alice’s transmission status T = 0, the probability of error can be decomposed as
P
(
Wˆ (i) , 0|T = 0
)
=
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{(
y(i) <
(
AB,(0)Y ∪ABY
))
or
(
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
)}
(272)
≤
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) < AB,(0)Y
}
(273)
+
∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
. (274)
The term in (273) corresponds to the probability that Bob receives an atypical y(i) (with respect to T = 0). The term in (274)
corresponds to the probability that Bob receives a y(i) ∈ ABY but there exists an inner-codeword x(i) falling into the conditionally
typical set ABX|y(i) . In Claims 17 and 18, we show that the terms in (273) and (274) decrease to zero as n grows without bound.
Claim 17 (Term in (273)). When Alice’s transmission status T = 0, the probability that Bob receives an atypical y(i) (with
respect to T = 0) is bounded from above as∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) < AB,(0)Y
}
≤ 2 exp
(
−k1p
3
nδ log n
)
.
Proof: The typical set AB,(0)Y when T = 0 is centered at p with width ∆y1 = n−1/4+δ/2 (recall that ∆y1 is the parameter, defined in
Section VI, specifying the “width” of the typical set AB,(0)Y ). We then use the Chernoff bound to calculate the probability of
receiving an atypical y(i) as follows:∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) < AB,(0)Y
}
= PNy
(
f y1 (Y
(i)) <
[
p
(
1 ± ∆y1
)])
(275)
≤ 2 exp
(
−k1p
3
nδ log n
)
. (276)

Claim 18 (Term in (274)). With probability at least 1 − 2−O((log n)3/4) over the inner code design, for the chosen inner code
C(i), the probability that Bob receives a typical y(i) as well as there exists an inner-codeword falling into the conditionally
typical set ABX|y(i) is bounded from above as∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1
log n
.
Proof: We first note that
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (277)
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TABLE III: Summary of probability of error of one single chunk
Claim (†) Probability of error contributed by the corresponding Claim Probability of the inner code satisfying (†)
Claim 14 at most 1/n 1 − 2 exp
(
−
( k1(ρ∗p)
3 n
δ + (ln 2)
)
(log n)
)
Claim 15 at most 1/(log n) 1 − 4(log n) · exp
(
− 13 k1k2p(log n)1/3
)
Claim 16 at most 1/(log n) 1 − 2−O
(
(log n)3/4
)
Claim 17 at most 2 exp
(
− k1 p3 nδ log n
)
1
Claim 18 at most 1/(log n) 1 − 2−O
(
(log n)3/4
)
≤ EC(i)
∑
w(i)
∑
y(i)∈ABY
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
} (278)
=
∑
w(i)
∑
x(i)w ∈{0,1}B
∑
y(i)∈ABY
PX(x(i)w )P(y
(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
(279)
= nrˆ ·
∑
y(i)∈ABY
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · PX(i)w
(
X(i) ∈ ABX|y(i)
)
. (280)
As noted in (258), for any y(i) ∈ ABY , the probability that a single inner-codeword falls into the conditionally typical set is
bounded from above as
PX(i)w
(
X(i) ∈ ABX|y(i)
)
≤ 4k21k22p(1 − p)(log n)4/3 · n−2k1d
√
q(1−q) 1−2p1−2q log
(
1−p
p
)
+O((log n)−1/3). (281)
The rest of the proof is the same as that of Claim 16. Combining (281) and the size of the inner-codebook nrˆ (as shown
in (263)), we have
EC(i)
 ∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
} ≤ 2−O((log n)3/4). (282)
Finally, by the Markov inequality, we obtain that with probability at least 1 − 2−O((log n)3/4) over the inner code design, the
randomly chosen inner code C(i) satisfies∑
y(i)∈{0,1}B
P(y(i)|x(i) = 0) · 1
{
y(i) ∈ ABY and ∃w(i) : x(i)w ∈ ABX|y(i)
}
≤ 1
log n
.
This completes the proof of Claim 18. 
Having proved Claims 14-18, it turns out that the probability of decoding error of one single chunk follows directly. A summary
of Claims 14-18 is presented in Table III. For notational convenience we define ζprob = 5(log n) · exp
(
− 13k1k2p(log n)1/3
)
, and
then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 19. With probability at least 1 − ζprob over the inner code design, for the randomly chosen inner code C(i), the
probability of error is bounded from above as
P
(
Wˆ (i) , W (i)
)
<
6
log n
.
Proof: By Table III and the union bound, for sufficiently large n, we prove that with probability at least 1 − ζprob over the inner
code design and for sufficiently large n, the probability of error of the chosen inner code is bounded from above as
P
(
Wˆ (i) , W (i)
)
= P
(
Wˆ (i) , W (i)
∣∣∣T = 1) + P(Wˆ (i) , 0∣∣∣T = 0) (283)
≤ 3
log n
+ n−1 + 2 exp
(
−k1p
3
nδ log n
)
(284)
≤ 6
log n
. (285)
Inequality (284) basically follows from Claims 14-18. This completes the proof of Lemma 19. 
B. Probability of error of the concatenated code
Lemma 20. With probability at least 1 − exp
(
− L3 ζprob
)
over the concatenated code design, for the randomly chosen code C,
the overall probability of error Perr is bounded from above as
Perr ≤ exp
(
−2√n/(k1(log n)2)
)
. (286)
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Proof: Lemma 19 shows that with probability at least 1− ζprob over the inner code design, the probability of error of a randomly
chosen inner code C(i) satisfies P
(
Wˆ (i) , W (i)
)
< 6/(log n). An inner code (for chunk i) is said to be a good inner code (for
chunk i) if the probability of error over the channel noise is bounded from above by 6/(log n), and is said to be a bad inner
code (for chunk i) otherwise. Let Λ1 and Λ2 be the number of chunk errors induced by good and bad inner codes respectively,
that the RS outer code will need to correct. In the following we focus on the impact of good and bad inner codes on number
of chunk in error.
(i) Impact of good inner codes on number of chunk in error: Since the number of good inner codes is at most L, and the
probability of error of good inner codes is bounded from above by 6/(log n), it then follows that the expected number of chunk
in error induced by good inner codes, E(Λ1), is bounded from above by 6L/(log n). By the Chernoff bound, with probability at
least 1 − exp (−2L/(log n)) over the code design, the number of chunk in error induced by good inner codes is bounded from
above by 12L/(log n).
(ii) Impact of bad inner codes on number of chunk in error: Note that the probability of generating a bad inner code is at
most ζprob, hence the expected number of bad inner codes is bounded from above by Lζprob. Since the inner codes are generated
independently, by the Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1 − exp
(
− L3 ζprob
)
over the code design, the number of bad
inner codes is bounded from above by 2Lζprob, which implies the number of chunk in error induced by bad inner codes, Λ2, is
bounded from above by 2Lζprob.
(iii) Concentration of overall inner codes in error: A concatenated code C is said to be a decent code if the number of bad
inner codes of C is no more than 2Lζprob. From (ii) we know that with probability at least 1 − exp
(
− L3 ζprob
)
over the code
design, a randomly chosen code C from the concatenated code ensemble is decent. Conditioned on the event that a decent code
C is chosen, it then follows from (i) that with probability at least 1 − exp (−2L/(log n)), the number of chunk in error induced
by good inner codes is bounded from above by 12L/(log n), and hence the number of overall inner codes in error is bounded
from above as
Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ 12Llog n + 2Lζprob ≤
14L
log n
, (287)
for sufficiently large n. Our outer Reed-Solomon code is able to correct 14L/(log n) errors, since the number of parity chunks
is 28L/(log n). Therefore, with probability at least16 1 − exp
(
− L3 ζprob
)
over the concatenated code design, for the randomly
chosen code C, the overall probability of error Perr is bounded from above as
Perr ≤ P
(
(Λ1 + Λ2) >
14L
log n
)
(288)
≤ exp
(
− 2L
log n
)
(289)
= exp
(
− 2
√
n
k1(log n)2
)
. (290)
This completes the proof of Lemma 20, as well as the proof of covertness of our codes, as in Property 2) in Theorem 1. 
IX. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper we put forth the first computationally efficient codes for simultaneously covert and reliable communication over
BSCs. Our coding scheme, which is proved to be both covert and reliable, achieves the best known throughput and ensures
that the computational complexity for both encoding and decoding is polynomial in the number of transmitted message bits.
Though both the exponent of the complexity and the blocklength for this performance to kick in are relatively high, it is still a
proof-of-concept first attempt to show the existence of such computationally efficient codes for covert communication. In fact,
getting the truly practical codes where the gap to covert throughput scales as the inverse of polynomial is still worthy exploring.
Having designed the coding scheme for BSCs, one would expect to generalize the concatenated-style codes to other DMCs and
AWGN channels. Though a detailed analysis is needed, it is plausible that a non-trivial combination of the code proposed in [2]
and our code results in corresponding concatenated-style codes for DMCs and AWGN channels. Besides such generalizations
of our code constructions to arbitrary DMCs and AWGN channels, another direction is to study different metrics for covertness,
a la [37].
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Appendix A
The Chernoff bound [40] is widely used in this work. Since there are many different versions of the Chernoff bound in the
literature, and each version has a slightly different formulation, in this Appendix we explicitly state the version of the Chernoff
bound [40] used throughout this work.
Suppose Q1, . . . ,Qn are independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) random variables taking values in {0, 1}. We
define Q as Q1 + · · · + Qn, and denote the expectation of Q by E(Q). Then for any 0 <  < 1,
P(Q ≥ (1 + )E(Q)) ≤ exp
(
− 
2E(Q)
3
)
, (291)
P(Q ≤ (1 − )E(Q)) ≤ exp
(
− 
2E(Q)
2
)
≤ exp
(
− 
2E(Q)
3
)
. (292)
Appendix B
We aim to calculate the value of I(x(i); z(i))+D(x(i) ‖ ρ) when f z1 ∈ (ρ∗q)(1±∆z1), f xz10 ∈ ρq(1±∆xz10), and f xz11 ∈ ρ(1−q)(1±∆xz11).
By definition, The first term I(x(i); z(i)) can be expressed as
I(x(i); z(i)) =
∑
( j, j′)∈{0,1}×{0,1}
f xzj j′ log
f xzj j′
f xj · f zj′
(293)
= f xz00 log
(
f xz00
(1 − f x1 )(1 − f z1 )
)
+ f xz01 log
(
f xz01
(1 − f x1 ) f z1
)
+ f xz10 log
(
f xz10
f x1 (1 − f z1 )
)
+ f xz11 log
(
f xz11
f x1 f
z
1
)
(294)
= (1 − f z1 − f xz10 ) log
(
1 − f z1 − f xz10
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )(1 − f z1 )
)
+ ( f z1 − f xz11 ) log
(
f z1 − f xz11
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 ) f z1
)
(295)
+ f xz10 log
(
f xz10
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )(1 − f z1 )
)
+ f xz11 log
(
f xz11
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 ) f
z
1
)
. (296)
It then follows that the partial derivative of I(x(i); z(i)) with respect to f z1 equals
∂I(x(i); z(i))
∂ f z1
= − log
(
1 − f z1 − f xz10
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )(1 − f z1 )
)
− f
xz
10
1 − f z1
+ log
(
f z1 − f xz11
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 ) f z1
)
+
f xz11
f z1
+
f xz10
1 − f z1
− f
xz
11
f z1
(297)
= log
(
f z1 − f xz11
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 ) f z1
· (1 − f
xz
10 − f xz11 )(1 − f z1 )
1 − f z1 − f xz10
)
(298)
= log
(
( f z1 − f xz11 )(1 − f z1 )
f z1 (1 − f z1 − f xz10 )
)
. (299)
Similarly, the partial derivative of I(x(i); z(i)) with respect to f xz10 equals
∂I(x(i); z(i))
∂ f xz10
= log
(
f xz10 (1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )(1 − f z1 − f xz10 )
)
, (300)
and the partial derivative of I(x(i); z(i)) with respect to f xz11 equals
∂I(x(i); z(i))
∂ f xz11
= log
(
f xz11 (1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )( f
z
1 − f xz11 )
)
. (301)
The second term D(x(i) ‖ ρ) can be expressed as
D(x(i) ‖ ρ) = f x0 log
f x0
1 − ρ + f
x
1 log
f x1
ρ
(302)
= (1 − f xz10 − f xz11 ) log
(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
1 − ρ + ( f
xz
10 + f
xz
11 ) log
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )
ρ
. (303)
The partial derivative of D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz10 equals
∂D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
∂ f xz10
= log
(
(1 − ρ)( f xz10 + f xz11 )
ρ(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
)
, (304)
and the partial derivative of D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz11 also equals
∂D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
∂ f xz11
= log
(
(1 − ρ)( f xz10 + f xz11 )
ρ(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
)
. (305)
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Therefore, the partial derivative of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz10 is given as
∂[I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)]
∂ f xz10
= log
(
f xz10 (1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )(1 − f z1 − f xz10 )
)
+ log
(
(1 − ρ)( f xz10 + f xz11 )
ρ(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
)
(306)
= log
(
f xz10 (1 − ρ)
ρ(1 − f z1 − f xz10 )
)
. (307)
Note that the value of term (307) is negative when f xz10 < ρ(1 − q) − (1 − 2q)ρ2 and f xz10 ∈ ρq(1 ± ∆xz10). The analysis of
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz10 is as follows:
• If ρq(1 + ∆xz10) ≤ ρ(1 − q) − (1 − 2q)ρ2, the value of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) decreases monotonically as f xz10 increases, and
hence I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) achieves maximum when f xz10 = ρq(1 − ∆xz10).
• If ρq(1+ ∆xz10) > ρ(1− q)− (1− 2q)ρ2, the value of I(x(i); z(i))+D(x(i) ‖ ρ) first decreases and then increases as f xz10 increases,
and hence I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) achieves maximum when f xz10 = ρq(1 − ∆xz10) or f xz10 = ρq(1 + ∆xz10).
Similarly, the partial derivative of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz11 is given as
∂[I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)]
∂ f xz11
= log
(
f xz11 (1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
( f xz10 + f
xz
11 )( f
z
1 − f xz11 )
)
+ log
(
(1 − ρ)( f xz10 + f xz11 )
ρ(1 − f xz10 − f xz11 )
)
(308)
= log
(
f xz11 (1 − ρ)
ρ( f z1 − f xz11 )
)
. (309)
Note that the value of term (309) is positive when f xz11 > ρq + (1 − 2q)ρ2 and f xz11 ∈ ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11). The analysis of
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) with respect to f xz11 is as follows:
• If ρ(1 − q)(1 − ∆xz11) ≥ ρq + (1 − 2q)ρ2, the value of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) increases monotonically as f xz11 increases, and
hence I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) achieves maximum when f xz11 = ρ(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11).
• If ρ(1− q)(1−∆xz11) < ρq+ (1− 2q)ρ2, the value of I(x(i); z(i))+D(x(i) ‖ ρ) first decreases and then increases as f xz11 increases,
and hence I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) achieves maximum when f xz11 = ρ(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11) or f xz11 = ρ(1 − q)(1 − ∆xz11).
Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that the value of f z1 has negligible impact on the value of I(x
(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ), since
( f z1 − ρ ∗ q)
∂I(x(i); z(i))
∂ f z1
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ∗q,ρq,ρ(1−q)
= O(n−1), (310)
while the value of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) scales as O(n−1/2). For simplicity, we set f z1 to be ρ ∗ q, since f z1 ∈ (ρ ∗ q)(1 ± ∆z1).
Therefore, the maximal value of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) is attained at one of the four “corner” points, i.e., ( f z1 , f xz10 , f xz11 ) =
(ρ ∗ q, ρq(1 ± ∆xz10), ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11)).
Appendix C
In Appendix B we have shown that the maximal value of I(x(i); z(i))+D(x(i) ‖ ρ) is attained at one of the four “corner” points,
i.e., f z1 = ρ ∗ q, f xz10 = ρq(1 ± ∆xz10), f xz11 = ρ(1 − q)(1 ± ∆xz11). We now prove that there exists an explicitly computable constant c1
such that for sufficiently large n,
−k1
√
n
[
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
]
≥ k1 ·
(
max
j∈{1,2,3,4}
{gi(q, d,∆xz10,∆xz11)} + c1n−1/2
)
. (311)
We first note that
− k1
√
n
[
I(x(i); z(i)) + D
(
x(i) ‖ ρ
)]
(312)
= k1
√
n
[
f xz00 log
f x0 f
z
0
f xz00
+ f xz01 log
f x0 f
z
1
f xz01
+ f xz10 log
f x1 f
z
0
f xz10
+ f xz11 log
f x1 f
z
1
f xz11
− f x0 log
f x0
1 − ρ − f
x
1 log
f x1
ρ
]
(313)
= k1
√
n
[
f xz00 log
f z0
f xz00
+ f xz01 log
f z1
f xz01
+ f xz10 log
f z0
f xz10
+ f xz11 log
f z1
f xz11
+ f x0 log f
x
0 + f
x
1 log f
x
1 − f x0 log
f x0
1 − ρ − f
x
1 log
f x1
ρ
]
(314)
= k1
√
n
[
( f xz01 + f
xz
11 )H
(
f xz11
f xz01 + f
xz
11
)
+ ( f xz00 + f
xz
10 )H
(
f xz10
f xz00 + f
xz
10
)
+ ( f xz10 + f
xz
11 ) log ρ + ( f
xz
00 + f
xz
01 ) log (1 − ρ)
]
. (315)
We now calculate the value of term (315) at one “corner” point, (i.e., f z1 = ρ∗q, f xz10 = ρq(1−∆xz10), f xz11 = ρ(1−q)(1+∆xz11), f xz01 =
f z1 − ρ(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11), and f xz00 = 1 − f z1 − ρq(1 − ∆xz10)), which equals
k1
√
n
[
( f xz01 + f
xz
11 )H
( f xz11
f xz01 + f
xz
11
)
+ ( f xz00 + f
xz
10 )H
( f xz10
f xz00 + f
xz
10
)
+ ( f xz10 + f
xz
11 ) log ρ + ( f
xz
00 + f
xz
01 ) log (1 − ρ)
]
(316)
= k1
√
n
[
f z1H
 k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√n f z1
 + (1 − f z1 )H
 k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√n(1 − f z1 )

38
+
k2q(1 − ∆xz10) + k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√
n
log
(
k2√
n
)
+
√
n −
(
k2q(1 − ∆xz10) + k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)
)
√
n
log
( √
n − k2√
n
)]
(317)
= k1
√
n
[
− f z1
k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√
n f z1
log
 k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√n f z1
 − f z1
√
n f z1 − k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√
n f z1
log
 √n f z1 − k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√n f z1

− (1 − f z1 )
k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√
n(1 − f z1 )
log
 k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√n(1 − f z1 )
 − (1 − f z1 )
√
n(1 − f z1 ) − k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√
n(1 − f z1 )
log
 √n(1 − f z1 ) − k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√n(1 − f z1 )

+
k2q(1 − ∆xz10) + k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)√
n
log
(
k2√
n
)
+
√
n −
(
k2q(1 − ∆xz10) + k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)
)
√
n
log
( √
n − k2√
n
)]
(318)
= k1
[
k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11) log
 √n f z1 − k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)(√n − k2)(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)
 + k2q(1 − ∆xz10) log
 √n(1 − f z1 ) − k2q(1 − ∆xz10)(√n − k2)q(1 − ∆xz10)

+
√
n f z1 log
 √n f z1 (1 − f z1 ) − f z1k2q(1 − ∆xz10)√n f z1 (1 − f z1 ) − (1 − f z1 )k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)
 + √n log  (√n − k2)(1 − f z∗1)√n(1 − f z1 ) − k2q(1 − ∆xz10)
] (319)
= k1
[
k2(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11) log
(
q
(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11)
)
+ k2q(1 − ∆xz10) log
(
1 − q
q(1 − ∆xz10)
)
+ k2
(
(1 − q)(1 + ∆xz11) − 1
)
log e + k2q(1 − ∆xz10) log e + O(n−1/2)
]
. (320)
Note that the term in (320) equals k1 ·
(
g1(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) + O(n−1/2)
)
, where the auxiliary multivariable function g1(u, v,w, t),
defined in Section IV, has the form
g1(u, v,w, t) = k2(u, v)
[
u(1 − w)
(
log
(
1 − u
u(1 − w)
)
+ log e
)
+ (1 − u)(1 + t)
(
log
(
u
(1 − u)(1 + t)
)
+ log e
)
− log e
]
. (321)
Similarly, we also calculate the values of −k1 √n
(
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
)
at the other three “corner” points, and it turns out
that these values can respectively be characterized by k1
(
g2(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) + O(n−1/2)
)
, k1
(
g3(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) + O(n−1/2)
)
and
k1
(
g4(q, d,∆xz10,∆
xz
11) + O(n−1/2)
)
. Since the maximal value of I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ) is attained at the “corner” points, we
conclude that there exists an explicitly computable constant c1 such that for sufficiently large n,
−k1
√
n
[
I(x(i); z(i)) + D(x(i) ‖ ρ)
]
≥ k1 ·
(
max
j∈{1,2,3,4}
{gi(q, d,∆xz10,∆xz11)} + c1n−1/2
)
. (322)
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Recall that the auxiliary function h(i), first defined in (108), has the form
h(i) =
(
k1
√
n log n
i
) (
k2q√
n
)i (
1 − k2q√
n
)k1 √n log n−i
. (323)
Let i0 = k1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)
. Then, via Stirling’s approximation [41, pp. 50-53], we can bound h(i0) from above as
h(i0) =
(
k1
√
n log n
i0
) (
k2q√
n
)i0 (
1 − k2q√
n
)k1 √n log n−i0
(324)
≤ 1√
2pii0
2
i0 log
(
ek1
√
n log n
i0
)
2
i0 log
(
k2q√
n
)
2(
k1
√
n log n−i0) log
( √
n−k2q√
n
)
(325)
=
1√
2pii0
2
i0 log
(
e
√
n
k2q(1+∆
xz
10)
)
2
i0 log
(
k2q√
n
)
2(
k1
√
n log n−i0) log
( √
n−k2q√
n
)
(326)
=
1√
2pii0
n
k1k2q(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
+[√n−k2q(1+∆xz10)]k1 log
( √
n−k2q√
n
)
(327)
=
1√
2pik1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)nk1k2q(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
− k1k2q
√
n log e√
n−k2q
+O(n−1/2)
, (328)
=
1√
2pik1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)nk1k2q
(
(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+O(n−1/2)
, (329)
where equality (328) follows from log
( √
n−k2q√
n
)
= − k2q log e√n−k2q +O(n−1), by applying Taylor’s series expansion. For sufficiently large
n, the term (329) is bounded from above by
1√
2pik1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)nk1k2q
(
(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
, (330)
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where δ = 0.01 is the slackness parameter first defined in Section IV. Note that the ratio between two successive terms is
h(i + 1)
h(i)
=
k1
√
n log n − i
i + 1
· k2q√
n − k2q
. (331)
Hence for i ≥ i0 = k1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)
, we have
h(i + 1)
h(i)
≤ h(i0 + 1)
h(i0)
=
k1
√
n log n − k1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)
k1k2q(log n)
(
1 + ∆xz10
)
+ 1
· k2q√
n − k2q
=
1
1 + ∆xz10
(
1 + O(n−1/2)
)
, (332)
and there exists an explicitly computable constant c3 such that for sufficiently large n,
h(i + 1)
h(i)
≤ 1
1 + ∆xz10
(
1 + c3n−1/2
)
. (333)
This implies that the tail of the series {h(i)} can be bounded from above by a geometric series as follows:
k1
√
n log n∑
i=i0
h(i) ≤ h(i0)
1 + (1 + c3n−1/21 + ∆xz10
)
+ · · · +
(
1 + c3n−1/2
1 + ∆xz10
)k1 √n log n−i0 (334)
≤ h(i0)
 ∞∑
j=0
(
1 + c3n−1/2
1 + ∆xz10
) j (335)
= h(i0)
(
1 + ∆xz10
∆xz10 − c3n−1/2
)
. (336)
Substituting in the bound on h(i0) from Equation (330) gives us
k1
√
n log n∑
i=i0
h(i) ≤
√√ 1 + ∆xz10
2pik1k2q
(
∆xz10 − c3n−1/2
)2
(log n)
· nk1k2q
(
(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
(337)
≤ n−k1k2q f (∆xz10)+δ/2, (338)
hence proving the term (109) in Section VII-A. Once the term (109) is proved, one can also show that the term (110) is bounded
from above by n−k1k2q f (∆
xz
10)+δ/2. Let i′0 = k1k2q(log n)(1 − ∆xz10), by a similar argument that we omit here, for sufficiently large n,
h(i′0) ≤
1√
2pik1k2q(log n)
(
1 − ∆xz10
)nk1k2q
(
(1−∆xz10) log
(
e
1−∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
. (339)
The summation of the first i′0 terms can further be bounded from above as
i′0∑
i=0
h(i) ≤ i′0 ·
1√
2pik1k2q(log n)
(
1 − ∆xz10
)nk1k2q
(
(1−∆xz10) log
(
e
1−∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
(340)
=
√
k1k2q(log n)(1 − ∆xz10)
2pi
n
k1k2q
(
(1−∆xz10) log
(
e
1−∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
(341)
< n
k1k2q
(
(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
(342)
= n−k1k2q f (∆
xz
10)+δ/2. (343)
Inequality (342) follows since for 0 < ∆xz10 < 1,(
1 − ∆xz10
)
log
(
e
1 − ∆xz10
)
<
(
1 + ∆xz10
)
log
(
e
1 + ∆xz10
)
, (344)
and hence for sufficiently large n,√
k1k2q(log n)(1 − ∆xz10)
2pi
n
k1k2q
(
(1−∆xz10) log
(
e
1−∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
< n
k1k2q
(
(1+∆xz10) log
(
e
1+∆xz10
)
−log e
)
+δ/2
. (345)
Similarly, one can also prove that for sufficiently large n, the terms (111) and (112) in Section VII-A respectively satisfy
k1
√
n log n∑
i=k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1+∆xz11)
h(i) ≤ n−k1k2(1−q) f (∆xz11)+δ/2, (346)
40
k1k2(1−q)(log n)(1−∆xz11)∑
i=0
h(i) ≤ n−k1k2(1−q) f (∆xz11)+δ/2. (347)
Appendix E
Suppose the generator matrix Gl1×L of a general Reed-Solomon code has the form (recall that l1 = λL)
1 1 1 . . . 1
µ1 µ2 µ3 . . . µL
...
...
...
. . .
...
µl1−11 µ
l1−1
2 µ
l1−1
3 . . . µ
l1−1
L
 , (348)
where µ1, µ2, . . . , µL ∈ F are all distinct. The systematic inner-message vector ws = [w(1),w(2), . . . ,w(l1)] of the Reed-Solomon
code is uniformly distributed over Fl1 , and whole inner-message vector w = ws ·Gl1×L = [w(1),w(1), . . . ,w(L)] ∈ FL. The code is
denoted by CRS =
{
w : w = ws ·Gl1×L, ∀ws ∈ Fl1
}
.
The generator matrix G′l1×L of a systematic Reed-Solomon code can be obtained by performing Gaussian eliminations on
Gl1×L, i.e., G′l1×L = A
−1 ·Gl1×L =
[
Il1×l1
∣∣∣ P ], where A−1 is an invertible matrix and Il1×l1 is an identity matrix. The systematic
Reed-Solomon code with G′l1×L is denoted by
CSRS =
{
w′ : w′ = ws ·G′l1×L, ∀ws ∈ Fl1
}
=
{
w′ : w′ = ws · A−1Gl1×L, ∀ws ∈ Fl1
}
=
{
w′ : w′ = ws ·Gl1×L, ∀ws ∈ Fl1
}
(349)
where Equation (349) holds since the linear mapping A−1 is bijective. Note that the systematic code CSRS with generator matrix
G′l1×L is same as CRS , hence in the following it suffices to study CRS and its corresponding generator matrix Gl1×L.
Let Gˆl1×l2 be a l1 × l2 matrix consisting of the last l2 columns of Gl1×L, with the form
Gˆl1×l2 ,

1 1 . . . 1
µl1+1 µl1+2 . . . µL
...
...
. . .
...
µl1−1l1+1 µ
l1−1
l1+2
. . . µl1−1L
 . (350)
For any specific parity inner-message vector wp = [w
(l1+1), . . . ,w(L)], the systematic inner-message vectors ws that could cause
it satisfies
ws · Gˆl1×l2 = wp, (351)
hence the set S(wp), defined in Section VIII, can be expressed as {ws : ws · Gˆl1×l2 = wp}. By noting the null space of the
Vandermonde matrix Gˆl1×l2 is (l1 − l2)-dimensional, we have
∣∣∣S(wp)∣∣∣ = |F|l1−l2 .
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As noted in Appendix E, the systematic RS code CSRS with generator matrix G′l1×L is the same as the RS code CRS with
generator matrix CRS , hence we stick to CRS in the following analysis. For a fixed parity inner-message vector wp, we calculate
how many pairs of (ws,w
′
s) satisfying ws ∈ S(wp), w′s ∈ S(wp) have distance t (t ≥ l2 + 1 since the minimum distance of CRS
is l2 + 1).
Let δ = [δ(1), δ(2), . . . , δ(t), 0, . . . , 0] be a length-l1 vector of weight t, where δ(i) , 0 (∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}). We first fix a
ws = [w
(1),w(2), . . . ,w(l1)] ∈ S(wp), and consider the number of w′s ∈ S(wp) such that ws and w′s differ in the first t locations.
Such w′s can be expressed as
w′s = ws + δ = [w
(1) + δ(1),w(2) + δ(2), . . . ,w(t) + δ(t),w(t+1), . . . ,w(l1)]. (352)
Since ws · Gˆl1×l2 = wp (recall that Gˆl1×l2 is defined in (350)) and
w′s · Gˆl1×l2 = (ws + δ) · Gˆl1×l2 = ws · Gˆl1×l2 + δ · Gˆl1×l2 = wp, (353)
we obtain δ · Gˆl1×l2 = 0. Let δ˜ be a length-t vector consisting of the first t element in δ, and G˜t×l2 be the first t rows of Gˆl1×l2 ,
i.e.,
G˜t×l2 ,

1 1 . . . 1
µl1+1 µl1+2 . . . µL
...
...
. . .
...
µt−1l1+1 µ
t−1
l1+2
. . . µt−1L
 . (354)
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Our goal is to calculate the size of {δ˜ : δ˜ · G˜t×l2 = 0 and δ(i) , 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}}. To do so, we treat the matrix G˜t×l2 as a
parity-check matrix of a linear code C˜. One can verify the linear code C˜ is a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code since
the length l(C˜) = t, the dimension k(C˜) = t − l2, and the minimum distance dmin(C˜) = l2 + 1 (by noting that any l2 rows are
linearly independent). For any MDS code, the weight distribution of C˜ is
Ai =
(
l(C˜)
i
)
(|F| − 1)
i−dmin(C˜)∑
j=0
(−1) j
(
i − 1
j
)
|F|i−dmin(C˜)− j, (355)
where Ai is the number of codewords in C˜ of Hamming weight i (dmin(C˜) ≤ i ≤ l(C˜)). By substituting l(C˜) = t, dmin(C˜) = l2 + 1,
|F| = nrˆ, and i = t, we obtain{
δ˜ : δ˜ · G˜t×l2 = 0 and δ(i) , 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
}
= (nrˆ − 1)
t−l2−1∑
j=0
(−1) j
(
t − 1
j
)
nrˆ(t− j−l2−1). (356)
It is worth noting that the above analysis only considers for a fixed ws ∈ S(wp), the number of w′s that differs from ws in the
first t coordinates. We still need to multiply (356) by
(
l1
t
)
(the number of different subsets of {1, 2, . . . , l1} of size t) and ν (the
number of systematic inner-message vectors that belong to S(wp)). Therefore, for a fixed wp, the number of (ws,w′s) satisfying
ws ∈ S(wp), w′s ∈ S(wp) have distance t (t ≥ l2 + 1) equals
ν ·
(
l1
t
)
(nrˆ − 1)
t−l2−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t − 1
i
) (
nrˆ
)t−i−l2−1
if t ≥ l2 + 1. (357)
Appendix G
In this Appendix we show that
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) + D(x(i)w˜ ‖ ρ) = ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − p
p
)
+ O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
, (358)
when (ρ ∗ p)(1 − ∆y1) ≤ f y1 ≤ (ρ ∗ p)(1 + ∆y1), f xy10 ∈ ρp(1 ± ∆xy10) and f xy11 ∈ ρ(1 − p)(1 ± ∆xy11), where ∆y1 = n−1/4+δ/2 and
∆
xy
10 = ∆
xy
11 = (log n)
−1/3. By applying Taylor’s series expansion with center at (ρ ∗ p, ρp, ρ(1 − p)), the empirical mutual
information I(x(i); y(i)) equals17
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) = I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p)) + ( f
y
1 − ρ ∗ p)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f y1
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
+ ( f xy10 − ρp)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy10
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
+ ( f xy11 − ρ(1 − p))
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy11
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
+ O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. (359)
The value of I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) at the center point (ρ ∗ p, ρp, ρ(1 − p)) equals
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))|(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p)) =
(
H(y(i)) − H(y(i)|x(i)w˜ )
) ∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p)) (360)
= H(ρ ∗ p) − H(p)
= D(p ‖ ρ ∗ p) + ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − ρ ∗ p
ρ ∗ p
)
(361)
= ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − p + O(n−1/2)
p + O(n−1/2)
)
+ O(n−1) (362)
= ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − p
p
)
+ O(n−1). (363)
Equation (362) follows from the Reverse Pinsker’s inequality [42], i.e.,
D(p ‖ ρ ∗ p) ≤ ρ
2(1 − 2p)2
2p(1 − p) ln 2 = O(n
−1). (364)
Similar to Equations (299)-(301) in Appendix B, we obtain the partial derivatives of I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) in f y1 , f
xy
10 and f
xy
11 as follows.
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f y1
= log
 ( f y1 − f xy11 )(1 − f y1 )
f y1 (1 − f y1 − f xy10 )
, (365)
17Note that the second and higher order derivative terms are bounded by O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
.
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∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy10
= log
 f xy10 (1 − f xy10 − f xy11 )( f xy10 + f xy11 )(1 − f y1 − f xy10 )
, (366)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy11
= log
 f xy11 (1 − f xy10 − f xy11 )( f xy10 + f xy11 )( f y1 − f xy11 )
. (367)
The values of these partial derivatives centered at (ρ ∗ p, ρp, ρ(1 − p)) are given by
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f y1
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= log
(
p(1 − ρ ∗ p)
(1 − p)(ρ ∗ p)
)
= O(n−1/2), (368)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy10
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= log
(
p
1 − p
)
= O(1), (369)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy11
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= log
(
1 − p
p
)
= O(1). (370)
Since ∆y1 = n
−1/4+δ/2 and ∆xy10 = ∆
xy
11 = (log n)
−1/3, we have
( f y1 − ρ ∗ p)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f y1
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= O(n−3/4+δ/2), (371)
( f xy10 − ρp)
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy10
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
, (372)
( f xy11 − ρ(1 − p))
∂I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i))
∂ f xy11
∣∣∣∣∣
(ρ∗p,ρp,ρ(1−p))
= O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. (373)
Up to now, we have already proved the empirical mutual information
I(x(i)w˜ ; y
(i)) = ρ(1 − 2p) log
(
1 − p
p
)
+ O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. (374)
The last step is to show the empirical KL divergence D(x(i)w˜ ‖ ρ) = O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. Since f xy10 = ρp(1 ± ∆xy10), f xy11 =
ρ(1 − p)(1 ± ∆xy11) and ∆xy10 = ∆xy11 = (log n)−1/3, the Hamming weight of x(i)w˜ falls into the range
[
ρ
(
1 − ∆xy10
)
, ρ
(
1 + ∆xy10
)]
. One
can show that
D
(
ρ(1 + ∆xy10) ‖ ρ
)
=
(
1 − ρ
(
1 + ∆xy10
))
log
1 − ρ(1 + ∆xy10)1 − ρ
 + ρ (1 + ∆xy10) log ρ(1 + ∆xy10)ρ
 (375)
=
(
1 − ρ
(
1 + ∆xy10
))
log
1 − ρ∆xy101 − ρ
 + ρ (1 + ∆xy10) log (1 + ∆xy10) (376)
=
(
1 − ρ
(
1 + ∆xy10
)) −
ρ∆
xy
10
1 − ρ −
(
ρ∆
xy
10
1−ρ
)2
2
− · · ·
 + ρ
(
1 + ∆xy10
) ∆xy10 −
(
∆
xy
10
)2
2
+ · · ·
 (377)
= O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. (378)
Similarly, D(ρ(1−∆xy10) ‖ ρ) also scales as O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. Finally, when f xy10 = ρp(1±∆xy10), f xy11 = ρ(1− p)(1±∆xy11), we have
D(x(i)w˜ ‖ ρ) ≤ max
{
D(ρ(1 − ∆xy10) ‖ ρ),D(ρ(1 + ∆xy10) ‖ ρ)
}
= O
(
n−1/2(log n)−1/3
)
. (379)
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